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Implementation of secure online examination system has been a hot topic in
the educational world in the last decade. Issues that should be addressed
in the secure online examination system are computer and network secu-
rity issues of the systems and prevention of cheating by participants. In
our research, we provide a website application and a secure network design
which prevents cheating by any participant among examinee, administrator,
and examiner. Different security features of the online examination system
are discussed both from the website application aspect and network design
aspect.
Unfortunately, website application and network design cannot meet some
security requirements because of several inside and outside attacks and mali-
cious behaviors of bribed, corrupted or unfair examiners and untrusted exam
authority, and we construct a particular online examination protocol to pre-
vent them.
We design an online examination protocol based on certificateless sign-
cryption and prove their security properties under the formal analysis using
ProVerif software. The proposed online examination protocol has several ad-
vantages over existing protocols such that there is no certificate unlike public
key infrastructure, no key escrow and lower computational cost by virtue of
the signcryption scheme.
Our results show that some of OES problems both of data security issue
such that scanning port attack and cheating problem especially by examinee
can be handled over the web application and network design system. While
some others will be handled by particular OES protocol. ProVerif shows
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The examination is one way to measure the success of learning process or
obtaining qualified human resources. In the field of training, the exam is
intended to measure the level of achievement by students or learners, so that
we can determine the level of understandings of the study being taken. In
the context of the recruitment of new employees, the exam is intended to
obtain qualified human resources [1], [2].
All of the examination systems including the national exam system in all
levels of education, whether it is an exam for students or exams for teachers,
have begun to shift from the manual or paper-based exam system to electronic
exam systems in order to make it more practical and effective. According to
the resources utilization, electronic exam can be categorized into three types
that is:
1. Computer-assisted examination; This type is not fully use computer.
Computer is only used to support the exam, i.e. exam uses computer
only for showing the exam questions or only for marking the exam
results.
2. Computer-based examination; Here, exam is taken on computer.
3. Online examination; Here, besides exam is taken on computer, exam
requires Internet connection to distribute the questions, answers and
results of exam. Online exam supports long distance or remote exam.
Nowadays, online examination systems becomes a hot topic. This type of
examination system is computerized, in which examinees answer test ques-
tions through a computer. Assessment is conducted directly by the system,
and examinees will receive their results immediately after the exam [3]. Sev-
eral researches and applications with any features have proposed to imple-
ment it.
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Although the online examination system has its advantages, computeriza-
tion incurs security problems. Each exam sessions need to deal with cheating
that could occur. So far, online examination system has mostly focused on
system security itself, such as the design of access control, defense against
attacks, closing security holes in the application such as PHP, SQL and op-
erating system or applications of encryption encryptions to database and
communication. However, there are a variety of cheating methods more cru-
cial in online examination systems than in conventional exam systems.
Cheating usually exploits weaknesses in the implementation of conven-
tional and online exams. Along with the development of information tech-
nology, there is also an increase in more diverse and sophisticated cheating
methods. An example is the use of spy cameras or modern communication
tools that are modified to make it undetectable by the exam committee.
1.1 Aims and Objectives
This research aims to study the problems in Online Examination System
which has described above, especially those which still has not been consid-
ered in the previous research. We intend to achieve those aims through four
objectives.
1. To identify problems in Online Examination systems (OES).
This is a very fundamental objective as it provides the basis of further
research and determines the model of framework and protocol of OES
that will be developed.
2. To develop a basic framework of OES. This is an important ob-
jective to achieve a solution in OES problems. We will construct web-
based application OES and design network system which solves some
problems which have been identified.
3. To design a new fast and secure protocol for developed frame-
work of OES.This objective consists in proposing a new faster and
effective exam protocols that meet the security requirements which sat-
isfies to our application and network design. It requires combining
secure cryptographic schemes to guarantee the often contrasting re-
quirements. This protocol is expected to be a future security protocol,
especially for OES.
4. To evaluate, security aspects of the designed OES protocol. To
this end, we evaluate the designed protocol under the com-
putational model and formal model. This objective is to expand
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the formal model analysis of OES protocol by considering also the user.
The desired outcome is to understand how user’s choices may influence
the security of exam protocols.
1.2 Contributions
This dissertation addresses the four objectives outlined in the previous sec-
tion. The dominant aim of this work is to construct a secure Online Exami-
nation System which secures in both of network system and several common
cheating methods. We claim the following issues as the contributions derived
from our work:
1. We have constructed a basic framework of secure online examination
system which can prevent several network penetration attacks and com-
mon cheating methods without a special browser and e-monitoring sys-
tem.
2. We have designed a secure and efficient communication protocol using
certificateless signcryption method.
1.3 Outline of the Dissertation
This dissertation is structured in five chapters. Most of the contents of the
dissertation have been published in conference papers or submitted to journal
articles. In the following, we outline the contents of each chapter.
1. Chapter 1: In this chapter, we have discussed the introduction to OES,
aims, objectives and contributions of our research.
2. Chapter 2: In this chapter, we present the preliminaries where are
required for implementation of our proposed scheme. Here, we will dis-
cuss mathematic of cryptography, elliptic curve cryptography, security
protocols and a little describing Proverif tools.
3. Chapter 3: Here we will discuss the problem of Online Examination
System, several related works and then our proposed model and imple-
mentation. In the end of this chapter, we will analyze our features.
4. Chapter 4: Here we have proposed a Certificateless Signcryption (CLSC)
protocol scheme and try to analyze the security and compared their
complexities and efficiency with another scheme.
3
5. Chapter 5: In this chapter, we describe our OES protocol based on
Certificateless Signcryption which has been proposed in the previous
chapter. Here, we will explain the formal analysis for proving the se-
curity of this proposed EOS protocol.





2.1 Mathematic of Cryptography
In this section, we will be going to explain various mathematical properties
of cryptography that is useful to understand the mathematics description
of this dissertation. Some important function like group, ring, field, elliptic
curve will be discussed here.
2.1.1 Modular Arithmetic
Modular arithmetic is defined as a system of arithmetic for integers, where
we are interested in the only remainder, not quotient [4].
Set of Residues: Zn Here Z is the set of an integer. Modulo operations re-
sult always gives a non-negative integer. Suppose n is the modulo operation
then the value of n is between 0 to n − 1 , suppose a mod n is any modulo
operation where ′a ′ is any integer then result varies between 0 to n − 1 .
As example: Zn = {0 , 1 , 2 , · · · , (n − 1 )}
Z2 = {0 , 1}
Z7 = {0 , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6}
Z11 = {0 , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10}
Additive Inverse: Suppose x and y are two number in Zn then it is called
additive inverse of one another if x + y = 0 (mod n)
As an example: in Z14 , 14 − 4 = 10 is additive inverse of 4 , so in generalized
way for Zn , y = n − x
Multiplicative Inverse: If there are two numbers x and y which are multi-
plicative inverse of each other. If x × y ≡ 1 (mod n) in Z10 , the multiplicative
inverse of 3 is 7 because 3 × 7 ≡ 1 (mod 10 ). The integer x in Zn has a mul-
tiplicative inverse exist only if gcd(n, x ) = 1 .
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For example, 8 have no multiplicative inverse in Z10 because gcd(10 , 8 ) 6= 1 .
The Set Zn : Its 3 instances are shown below:
1. Z ∗n : The set, Z
∗
n is defined as a subset of Zn and it contains elements of
set Zn that have a multiplicative inverse. In the set Zn , all the elements
have an additive inverse, but only some members have a multiplicative
inverse.
Example:Z10 = {0 , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9},Z ∗10 = {1 , 3 , 7 , 9}
2. Zp : In the set Zp , p is a prime number and same as Zn i.e., contains
all elements from 0 to p − 1 . In Zp , all the elements. Note: We need




Example:Z13 = {0 , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 12}
3. Z ∗p : In the Set Z
∗
p , p is a prime number and same as Z
∗
n i.e., contains
all the elements from 1 to p − 1 . In Z ∗p , all the elements have additive
and multiplicative inverse.
Example:Z ∗13 = {1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 12}
2.1.2 Algebraic Structures
In this session, we briefly discuss the subject of algebraic structure. An
algebraic structure is defined as the set of the element with an operation
that is applied to the element of the set. There are three common algebraic
structures known as groups, rings, and fields [4].
1. Groups: A group (G) can be defined as a set of elements, which
satisfies the following four properties with a binary operation, denoted
as G = 〈{· · ·}, · 〉.
• Closure: We can define as, If a, b ∈ G , then c = a· b ∈ G .
• Associativity: We can define as, If a, b, c ∈ G then (a· b)· c = a· (b· c).
• Identity: We can define as, ∀a ∈ G , there exists an identity ele-
ment e, such that e· a = a· e = a.
• Inverse: We can define as, ∀a ∈ G ,∃a¯, called the inverse of a,
such that a· a¯ = a¯· a = e.
If there is a group which satisfies above four properties along with
commutative property, it is called commutative group or Abelian group.
Commutative property means ∀a ∈ G , we have a· b = b· a.
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Finite Group: A set can be called as finite group if it contains a finite
number of elements, otherwise it is an infinite group.
Order of a Group: Order of a group is total number of elements that
contains in a group, i.e., |G |.
Subgroups: A subgroup is a subset of group and subgroup itself is a
group. If G and H are two groups of the same operation and elements
of H is a subset of element of G , then H is subgroup of G . The above
definition implies that:
• If a, b ∈ G and H , then c = a· b ∈ G and H .
• Both group and subgroup share the same identity element.
• If a ∈ G and H , then a¯ ∈ G and H .
• The group made of identity element of G ,H = 〈{e}, · 〉 is a sub-
group of G.
• Each group is a subgroup of itself.
Cyclic Subgroups: A subgroup of a group is called cyclic subgroup if
all the elements of the group generated using the power of an element.
The term power means repeatedly applying the group operation to the
element.
an → a· a· a· · · · · a (n times).
Cyclic Groups: The element that generates all the elements of the
cyclic subgroup can also generate all the elements group is called a
generator. A cyclic group is a group that itself own cyclic subgroup.
If g is a generator, the element in the finite group can be written as
{e, g , g2 , · · · , gn−1},where gn = e.
2. Rings: A Ring(R) is a set of two binary operations. It is denoted as
R = 〈{· · ·}, · ,+〉. The first and second operation must satisfy all five
and two properties respectively. In addition, the second operation must
be distributed over first, means that for all a, b and c elements of R.
We have a + (b· c) = (a + b)· (a + c) and (a· b) + c = (a + c)· (b + c).
If the second operation satisfies commutative operation, then the ring
is called commutative ring.
3. Fields: A Field (F ) is a set of elements with a binary operation, de-
noted as F = 〈{· · ·}, · ,+〉. Both two operations satisfy all five proper-
ties except the identity of the first operation has no inverse.
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2.2 Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Elliptic-curve system in cryptography is suggested in 1985 [5] by Victor Miller
and Neal Koblitz as an alternative mechanism for implementing public-key
cryptography based on an elliptic curve over a finite field. ECC is based
on discrete logarithm that is much more difficult to challenge at equivalent
key lengths as compared to other public key cryptography. ECC will use
the smaller key if we compare to other public key cryptography in the same
security level. So, it is used widely in lower resource system like mobile
communication.
Definition : An Elliptic-curve [5] over a field which is finite, is a non-singular
cubic curve that has 2 variables, where f (P ,Q) = 0 . The field P is usually
taken to be the complex numbers, real numbers, rational numbers, algebraic
expressions of rational numbers or a finite field. By, non-singular means all
3 roots of EC must be distinct.
General form of elliptic-curve (EC):
Figure 2.1: graphical representation of elliptic curve y2 = x 3 − x + 1
Properties:
1. Symmetric over x -axis.
2. The cubic curve in the variable x .
Any elliptic curve can be defined by following equation. A2 = B3 + aB + b,
here B is not a continuous point, chosen from particular field GF (P) or
GF (2 k). The figure 2.1 shows the elliptic curve of equation y2 = x 3 − x + 1 .
The advantages of ECC:
The National Institute of Standards and Technology recommended the
key sizes to protect keys used in conventional encryption algorithms like the
(DES) and (AES) together with the key sizes for RSA, Diffie-Hellman and
elliptic curves that are needed to provide equivalent security are given in
Table 2.1.
8







From above table, we can see that if the symmetric key size increases the
required key sizes for RSA and Diffie-Hellman increase at a much faster rate
than the required key sizes for elliptic curve cryptosystems. Hence, elliptic
curve systems offer more security per bit increase in key size than either RSA
or Diffie-Hellman public key systems.
Elliptic Curve Hardest Problem
This section describes the definition of the hard computational problems
in which the security of the proposed scheme relies on [7].
1. Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem
With the given two point of an elliptic curve A and B , where A = k ·B ,
it is difficult to find out the value of k .
2. Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Problem
With the given two points of elliptic curve A and B , where A = c·G
and B = d ·G without c and d , it is difficult to find out another point
K = c· d ·G . The ECDLP and ECDHP are computationally infeasible
problems.
2.3 Security Protocols
Security protocol is one of the most important mechanisms in providing se-
curity networks because crucial data or information is hidden by this mech-
anism. Some security protocols are built for a specific use with a variety
of purposes, such as secure channel (SSH/SSL or TLS/IPSec), wi-fi (WEP/
WPA/ WPA2), banking, e-voting, certified mail, mobile phone, etc. Fig-
ure 2.2 illustrates one example of a protocol, namely the Denning-Sacco key
distribution protocol [8]. The goal of this protocol is for the key k to be a
secret key shared between A and B, so that s can be kept confidential upon
delivery because it is encrypted by using a key k.
9
Figure 2.2: Simplified Denning-Sacco key distribution Protocol
In reality, this protocol still cannot be considered secure, for an active C
attacker could impersonate A and obtain the secret s. Figure 2.3 illustrates
how the (well-known) attack is against this protocol.
Figure 2.3: Attacking of Denning-Sacco key distribution Protocol
With a little analysis and modifications to this protocol, C cannot imper-
sonate A as shown in the Figure 2.4. This is because in the previous attack,
the first message namely {{A,C, k}skA}pkB,cannot be accepted by B.
Figure 2.4: Revision of Denning-Sacco key distribution Protocol
In order to analyzing and proofing security level of protocol, cryptogra-
pher needs to verify the protocols. Now, the verification of protocols has
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been and still a very active research topic because the protocol design is er-
ror prone and these errors are not detected by testing, they appear only in
the presence of an adversary. Besides, errors can have serious consequences.
There are two main frameworks for analyzing security protocols:
1. The Dolev - Yao model: a formal or abstract model. Here, the crypto-
graphic primitives are ideal black boxes and adversary or attacker uses
only those primitives. Proof can be done automatically by Pro Verif
tool [9].
2. The Computational model: a realistic model which the cryptography
primitives are functions on bit-strings and the adversary is a polynomial-
time Turing machine. Several proofs are done manually but some auto-
matic prover sound in the computational model. One of them is Crypto
Verif [10].
Both of models usually assume active attackers which have some ability,
e.g. the attacker can intercept all messages sent through the network, com-
pute messages and send messages through the network.
The Dolev-Yao Model for OES Protocol: The threat model of an online
examination protocol consist of a Dolev-Yao attacker who has full control of
the network, namely of the public channel. In the public channels, an at-
tacker can eavesdrop, drop, substitute, duplicate, and delay messages that
senders sent to receivers. In addition the ability of an attacker can be ex-
tended with corrupted principals. He can also inject message of his choice
into the public channel, and exploid the algebraic properties of cryptographic
primitives because a theory of equational. However, We has private chan-
nel. In private channel, attackers has not control which are normally used to
model out-of-band communication between processes. The attacker cannot
see and know all communications happen over private channel.
2.4 ProVerif
ProVerif is a tool created specifically to verify cryptographic protocol [9].
ProVerif has the ability to verify the protocol with an unlimited number
of sessions. A model that is run on a limited number of sessions has the
disadvantage of if the user has specified the number of sessions and the results
issued by the tool indicates that there was no attack on the protocol according
to the number of sessions stated. Thus, the existence of attacks in a larger
number of sessions cannot be ascertained. ProVerif allows users to find the
attack that occurred by using a representation with an unlimited number of
sessions.
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At first, ProVerif can only accept modeling input that is written using
Horn clause representation. With this representation, ProVerif can verify
security secrecy objectives explicitly and authenticate implicitly. ProVerif
was then developed in order to receive modeling input written in the cal-
culus model representation, as well as to verify the authentication security
objectives explicitly.
When ProVerif claims that a protocol does meet the security secrecy
objectives and/or authentication, the secrecy and/or authentication of the
protocol is definitely guaranteed. In other words, no attacks were found.
However, if ProVerif issues an output of a possible attack channel, then the
output should still be examined. The results of this output can be either an
actual attack channel or only a false attack.
Process calculus is an approach used to model processes that run in par-
allel. ProVerif uses a representation of pi calculus enriched with some syntax
(Table 2.2) to model the cryptographic protocol and security objectives. This
representation is hereinafter referred to as the representations process calcu-
lus.
Table 2.2: Syntax of Process Calculus
M , N ::= terms
x , y , z variable
a, b, c, k name
f(M1 , · · · , Mn) constructor application
P , Q ::= Processes
M¯ 〈N 〉·P output
M (x )·P input
0 nil
P |Q parallel composition
!P replication
(va)P restriction
let x = g(M1 , · · · , Mn) in P else Q destructor application
Q event
begin(M )·P begin event
end(M )·P end event
begin ex (M ) executed begin event
end ex (M ) executed end event
The syntax of process calculus consists of definitions of terms and process.
Terms could be a variable, name, or constructor application. While the
process can be:
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• Process output M 〈N 〉·P means sending message N to channel M and
then executing process P .
• Process input M (x )·P means receiving message x from channel M
and then executing process P . In executing process P , x in P will be
substituted with a message received through M .
• Process 0 (zero) will not do anything.
• Process P |Q is a parallel composition of P and Q .
• Replication !P represents a number of process P copies that are unlim-
ited in number and run parallel, namely P |P |P · · ·.
• Restriction (va)P form a new name a and then executes process P .
• A process that is a destructor application have the form of
let x = g(M1 , · · · ,Mn) in P else Q . This process means it will evalu-
ate destructor x = g(M1 , · · · ,Mn). If evaluation is successful, then the
evaluation result becomes the value of evaluation x and process P is
then executed.
Process begin(M )·P , end(M )·P , begin ex (M ), and end ex (M ) is typ-
ically used in specifying authentication. Process begin(M )·P issues event
begin(M ) and then executes process P . This process is used as a sign that
the protocol participant has started its role in a protocol session. This process
is paired with the end(M )·P process which means issuing event end(M ) and
then executing P . This process is used as a sign that the protocol participants
have terminated its role in a protocol session. begin ex (M ) and end ex (M )
processes are used to remember that event begin(M ) and end(M ) has been
executed. Both of these processes are not used directly in the modeling pro-
tocol but in the reduction process that defines the semantics of the process
calculus being used.
In addition to the definition of the term process above, there is also the
definition of let x = M in P that gives the same meaning to run process
P in which the emergence of x in P will be substituted with M . Addi-
tionally, the definition if M = N then P else Q gives the same meaning as
let x = equal (M ,N ) in P else equal Q . Equal destructor has a definition
of equal (M ,N )→ M . The constructor and destructor for the cryptography
operations can be found in table 2.3.
As an example, a simplified Needham-Schoeder Public Key protocol is
used with the following specifications:
1. A→ B : {NA}pkB
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Table 2.3: Constructor and Destructor in Process Calculus
Symmetric key encryption
Constructor Encrypt message M with key N , senc(M , N )
Destructor Decrypt sdec(senc(M , N ), N )→ M
Asymmetric key encryption
ConstructorGenerate public key from private N , pk(N )
Encrypt message M with public key N , penc(M , N )
Destructor Decrypt pdec(penc(M , pk(N )), N )→ M
Digital Signature
Constructor Signature message M with private key N , sign(M , N )
Destructor Verify signature checksign(sign(M , N ), pk(N )→ M
Message without signature getmess(sign(M , N )→ M
Hash Function
ConstructorHash function of message M , H (M )
Destructor -
Tuple with n arity
ConstructorTuple ntuple(M1 , · · · , Mn)
Destructor Projection, i thn (ntuple(M1 , · · · , Mn))→ Mi , i ∈ (1 , · · · , n)
2. B → A : {NA,NB}pkA
3. A→ B : {NB}pkB
The protocol can be represented with process calculus as seen in the
following process P:
P = (vskA)(vskB)letpkA = pk(skA)inletpkB = pk(skB)in
cpkA.cpkB .((!PA(skA, pkA))(!PB(skB , pkB , pkA)))
With PA dan PB defined as follows:
PA(skA, pkA) = c(x pkB).begin(x pkB).(v .Na)c〈penc(Na, x pkB)〉.c(m2 ).
let w = pdec(m2 , skA) in let na = 1
st
2 (w)in
let nb = 2 nd2 (w) in if na = Na then
c〈penc(Nb, xpkB)〉.0
PB(skB , pkB , pkA) = c(m1 ). let y Na = pdec(m1 , skB) in
let (vNb)c〈penc(2tuple(yNa,Nb), pkA)〉.c(m3 ).
let y Nb = pdec(m3 .skB) in if y Nb = Nb then
end(pkB).0
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Channel c has access to the public, including to the attacker. According
to the Dolev-Yao model, the attacker can find out all the messages exchanged
in this channel, create a new message from this information, and then send
it to the same channel.
Process P begins with the creation of private and public keys of A and
B . The public key is then sent via channel c to model the public key that is
made known to the public and became the initial information of the attacker.
After that processes PA and PB will be run in parallel where each process is
executed with an unlimited number of sessions.
Process PA represents messages received and sent by A. In this process,
A first receive the public key via channel c to indicate with whom A com-
municates. A then issues event begin(x pkB) as a sign that it had started a
session with parties that have x pkB . A then creates nonce Na, encrypts it
with the public key that it received and sends it through channel c. A later
receives message m2 which it decrypts with its private key and obtains two
nonce, namely na and nb. If nonce na is the same as nonce Na previously
sent through channel c, then A will be confident that it communicated with
the owner of x pkB and send the last message in the protocol, namely nonce
nb (which it previously received) encrypted with public key x pkB .
Meanwhile process PB represents messages received and sent by B . In
this process, B receives message m1 that corresponds to a message sent by A,
namely Na encrypted with public-key B . It then encrypts this message with
its private-key and obtains nonce y Na. Next, it creates nonce Nb and sends
the nonce and y Na encrypted with public-key A. B then receives message
m3 which corresponds to the message sent by A, namely Nb encrypted with
public-key B . It then decrypts it with its private-key and obtains nonce y Nb.
If y Nb is the same as the previous nonce Nb, it is sent through channel c
then, B is convinced that it is communicating with A. It then issues event
end(pkB) as a sign that it has completed a session with A.
In applied phi-calculus, secrecy can be modelled as a reachability prop-
erty. The secrecy of a term m is preserved if an attacker, defined as arbitrary
process, cannot construct m from any run in of protocol. There are two
definitions to model secrecy, name-distinct and reachability-based secrecy.
A name-distinct process signifies that the name mentioned in a term appear
unambiguously in the process either free or bound names. While reachability-
based secrecy says that an attacker cannot build a process A that can output
the secret term m.
In the other hand, the notion of observational equivalence can capture
privacy requirements. Informally, two processes are observational equiva-
lence if an observer cannot distinguish the process despite they might handle
different data or perform distinct computation.
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Authentication can be defined using correspondence assertions. An event
e is a message emitted into a special channel that is not under the control of
attacker. Event may contain arguments M1 , ,Mn , which are never revealed to
the attacker . Events do not change the behavior of process in which they are
located, but normally flag important steps in the execution of protocol. To
model correspondence assertions, we annotate processes with events such as
e〈M1 , ,Mn〉 and reason about the relationship (→) between events and their
arguments in the form if an event e〈M1 , ,Mn〉 has been executed, then event
e〈M1 , ,Mn〉 has been previously executed, which formalized as the following
form:
e〈M1 , ,Mn〉 → e〈M1 , ,Mn〉
By adding key word inj, it is possible to model injective correspondence
assertions, which signifies that if an event e〈M1 , ,Mn〉 has been executed,
then a distinct earlier occurrence of event e〈M1 , ,Mn〉 has been previously
executed. we formalized as the following form:




Online examination system (OES) is an exam based on the Internet without
paper, each action of examination is conducted through the network e.g.
the delivery of question sheets and answers to the test. In recently years,
OES are really a research challenge for any situation of exam related with
long distance learning and truly online. The environment situation of online
examination cannot be totally controlled or can be fully controlled depend
on the situations during an exam. We have to consider which situation of
our online exam because the situation of exam will influence how to keep the
security of our system and how to prevent cheating during the exam.
In order to make easier for design our system, we consider and make
several assumptions as a target situation of our OES:
1. In the OES framework, there is a basic computer used by each par-
ticipant. A large number of participants located in several places take
exam at a fixed time and at a fixed axam seat.Limited number of su-
pervisors are in each room during the exams.
2. OES consists of 3 entities which are the examinee, administrator and
examiner. Each of this entity has a privileged access to different pages.
3. Examinees take the exam in a secure place or room such as a computer
lab or ICT center which has already been set and registered for OES.
4. The examiner executes set-up exam questions from registered place or
computer.
5. Whether grading process can be done automatically by the system or
manually by the examiner depends on their type of questions.
6. Manual grading will be performed by examiner in a registered place.
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3.1 Problem on OES
Before we go to the next step, we need to identify the problem of our OES
related to the target situation above. As we know, OES cannot separate with
computer network systems and the main problem here is security. Computers
and network security problems occur due to the presence of securities hole in
the system both of its network design and program coding. The existence of
security hole allows someone both of inside attacker and outside attackers to
access the system by illegally stealing exam questions and answers, making
changes to existing value, or another type of modifications. Web design
security is very important because it has a content that must be protected.
Without any prevention method, anyone can penetrate into the web and
obtain data stored on the web. There are several security aspects that should
be guaranteed in the OES:
1. Database secrecy; There are so many sensitive data in OES that should
be kept secret.
2. Data Integrity; We have to ensure that all received data during com-
munication is real data.
3. Authenticity; Authenticities of all messages, transactions or other ex-
change of information before, during and after the exam must be en-
sured.
4. Data secrecy of transmission; OES is often constructed as a server
and client system. Sensitive data transmitted among them should be
protected.
5. Data access control; Data on OES only should be accessed on the spe-
cific time and place.
In addition to the security issue of the computer and networking systems,
the other important issue in the OES is cheating prevention. There are
many techniques that are often used by the examinee to obtain exam answers
illegally, for instance, browsing the Internet, using messenger communication
or other common cheating techniques. The following are some of the basic
techniques used to get answers illegally during the exam:
1. Browsing on the Internet; Examinee can seek answers to questions by
utilizing existing search engines like Google or Yahoo.
2. Using the Internet messenger for communication; Examinee can have
discussions with others either existing in the same network or outside
networks by using the messenger facility.
18
Figure 3.1: Problems of Online Examination System
3. Communication with others; Without or limited proctor supervision,
the examinee can have discussions with other examinees in the same
room or at a far distance via a portable device brought in by the ex-
aminee.
4. Access to local or external storage; Examinee can find an answer to ac-
cessing files on local or external storage such as flash drive or CD/DVD
installed on the PC where they are doing the test.
5. Reading a book or tutorial directly; Examinee can find the answer by
reading a book or tutorial directly because there is no exam supervisor.
6. Collusion; Examinee and administrator or examiner can have collude
in order to increase their exam score.
Besides the cheating by examinee, there are some threats possible occurs
in online examination system such that bribed, corrupted or unfair examiner
and dishonest or untrusted exam authority. Figure 3.1 shows the problems
diagram of online examination systems.
3.2 Related Work
According to [11], the basics dilemma in Online Examination system is in-
tegrity and secrecy of the questions, answers, grades and examines itself,
collaborating and cheating examinees. These ”honesty control issues” also
apply to traditional classroom courses in which the instructor uses online,
out-of-class exams to save classroom time for non-exam purposes. They pro-
pose eight control procedure to solve this dilemma, they are an exam should
be scheduled for a specific date and time, an exam should close when the
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allotted time period for work expires, an exam should be open to Internet
access for only a limited time period, examinees can only solve one question
at a time and cannot access completed questions. A student can access the
exam only once, an exam should be limited to special purpose browser, an
exam should be a randomizing question and answer choices, and about one-
third of objective type questions should be rotated or modified in each exam
every term.
There are several Content Management System (CMS) for online educa-
tion that utilizes web-based commercial courses management software such
as Moodle, Web CT, Blackboard, or software developed in-house. This soft-
ware is not used widely for online exams, due to security vulnerabilities, and
the system must rely on students honesty or their having an honour code [1].
Besides, CMS still does not have enough cheating control in their system. In
order to prevent cheating by examinee, many general CMSs have functions
to form test-problem sets randomly from pools and to analyze answers from
students. For example of Blackboard, one of the famous CMSs, can compose
a test which poses a different set of problems to every student based on a
pool and categories of problems, and inform its examiner of statistics such as
difficulties and discrimination of the problems by analyzing student answers
based on the item responses theory.
A simple solution to the issue of computer and network security and
cheating on online exams was proposed in many papers [1, 2, 3, 12, 13, 14].
One solution is called an enhanced Security Control System in the Online
Exam (SeCOnE) which is based on group cryptography with an e-monitoring
scheme [13]. The other cryptographic schemes was proposed [1, 2, 12, 15].
The control of cheating problems in online examination system by using
camera as e-monitoring was proposed in [1, 2, 15].
Implementation of online examination system has been offered in [16, 17].
They tried to build OES by offering some important features in their models
such as the user’s registration, examination instruction, a valid time of exam
and time reminders. They used three entities that will access to their system
namely admin, teacher, and student.
On the other hand, the characteristics and potential ways of cheating dur-
ing the online exam process and the shortage of existing Online Examination
Systems, anti-cheating measures were analyzed by [14]. They provide two
solutions to prevent cheating. The first solution is based on the automatic
generating examination paper algorithm which takes advantage of the knap-
sack problem principle. The other solution is based on the self-developed
ActiveX control.
Another thing that has not been considered in the existing system is the
possibility of collusion between the examinees with examiner or administrator
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to improve the exam results. Or cheating can be committed by the examiner
or administrator to change the results of an exam.
After reviewing several working above, we found some existing problems
which will be considered in our discussion as follow:
1. E-monitoring as a solution for cheating problem needs high cost and
widely bandwidth, so we try to reduce some examinee cheating tech-
niques by another method without e-monitoring.
2. In order to prevent cheating by examinee like browsing, using messen-
ger, accessing local or external storage in the network system, several
OES applications use special purpose browser e.g. Safe Exam Browsers
(SEB) or Respondus Lockdown Browser as one of solution. Unfortu-
nately, this is compatible only for specific web based exam which offer
a quiz mode. Besides, special purpose browser can be high cost and
difficult to use for partial examinees. We need to design a cheaper and
more practice way to handle this condition.
3. Cheating can be done by some examinees if they can set their own
schedule and prepare their seating position when to take an exam.
There is no referenced paper or application which is special solving
this problem.
4. Until recently in several online exam application, password hash was
established as sort of de facto standard to use MD5 hash algorithm for
protecting passwords. It becomes so popular that various public hash
databases appeared online like http://www.md5decrypter.com. We
need to construct our online exam with another newest hash algorithm
like SH3 algorithm.
5. We need a perfect distribution of random algorithm of questions be-
cause the shuﬄe methods used by some CMSs are not fully uniform
distributions.
6. Collusion between examinee and administrator can be done if examiner
could not access to the system even just looking and downloading the
exam result.
In order to ensure fairness of online examination and solving some existing
problems above, our challenge here is to make a secure online examination
system application with several new features that are not owned by any other
systems that we referenced. Table 3.1 shows a comparison of several online
examination systems with our scheme.
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Table 3.1: Features comparison of Online Examination Systems
Features Ours SI[1] LG[14]CDS[15]HB[16] IRI[17]
Browsing Guard Yes No Yes No No No
The Internet Messenger Guard Yes No Yes No No No
Time Limit Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local Data Accessing Prevention Yes No Yes No No No
Ext.Storage Accessing Prevention Yes No Yes No No No
Random Question Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Random Scheduling Yes No No No No No
Random Seating Yes No No No No No
Bank Question Yes No No No Yes Yes
Question Analyzing Yes No No No No No
Collusion Prevention Yes No No No No Yes
E-Monitoring No Yes No Yes No No
Yes/No: Feature shown in the left column is/is not held.
3.3 Model and Implementation
In this section, we offer a secure web-based online examination system along
with network design so that the system [18] is expected to prevent cheating
and network security that often occurs, which is either done by the partici-
pants taking the exam or by persons outside the system trying to penetrate.
3.3.1 Web Security Design
We try to utilize a secure website, which follows the recommendation by
[11] about online exam control procedure. We can see the detail of pages in
Figure 3.2.
The examinee page consists of 3 sub pages which are Home, Take a Test
and View Result. To access these pages, an examinee must have a registered
user name and password. Home is the first page that can be accessed after
successful login. The most important subpage for the examinee is Take a
Test page. The examinee must be aware of some properties when this page
has been accessed, which are:
1. The type of test that will appear on this page and which will be accessed
by the examinee is the test that has been registered as the test program.
2. Be at the place (PC Client’s identity) that has been determined by the
system when registration process.
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Figure 3.2: Online Examination System
3. Be at the time range that has been determined by the system when
registration process.
4. After selecting the test subject, the timer will start and not be stopped
until the time run out.
5. The questions will appear one by one on each page with the questions
and candidates of answer appearing randomly for each examinee.
6. Each examinee can do the test only once. After that, the examinee will
no longer be able to access the test questions.
7. Results are displayed for each examinee at the end of exam for automat-
ically grading. Such a treatment rules out of manipulation of results.
While for manually grading, the system will follow some procedure until
the examinee gets his result (see: chapter 5.).
8. An honest examinee can see their result of the test but not that of
other examinees.
9. Communication process of each processes will run on the particular
secure protocol.
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The second page is the administrator page. This page is the most im-
portant element of the online test system. In this page, all of the test terms
are organized, such as the test schedule organization, examinee organization,
inputting of test questions to the bank question, managing the study pro-
gram, managing grades, managing subject, managing PC client which will be
used by examinee to take an exam and manage of username and password.
Besides, the administrator can view an exam result and question analysis
when the examination has finished. It is recommended that there should
be a limited number of people who can access the page for maximizing the
security of data and system. The administrator has several terms too, which
are:
1. Administrators can add, change and remove the question in a Bank
Questions or Test Managing. In addition, we have feature for import
questions from Excel file (*.xls or *.xlsx) with the particular format to
the bank question.
2. Administrator can see the test result but they could not edit it.
3. The administrator registers an examinee but they could not see or edit
the User name or password. User name and password are generated
by the system at randomly and sent directly to the examinee’s email
when registration process.
4. The administrator manages an exam schedule but they could not see or
edit the examinee’s schedules and examinee’s place to take the exam.
Schedule and place are generated by the system at randomly and sent
directly to the examinee’s email when registration process.
5. The administrator could not deceive or make collusion with examinee
because the result of an exam can be seen by the examiner board.
Examiners board can be teachers association or school leaders.
The third page is examiner board page. It requires username and pass-
word authentication to access it, even though this page is only a viewing
mode page. For those who can access this page, they can only view the test
results and question analysis in several options like viewing the overall sub-
ject and all examinees for each grade, viewing daily results of each subject
and viewing the question analysis. Questions Analysis page analyzes the dif-
ficulty of the question based on the answer of examinee and output of three
categories of question, hard, moderate or easy. The Questions Analysis page
can be used as a reference for teachers to know which materials are still not
understood by the students.
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3.3.2 General Network Security Design
Network design is also one of the main elements of the online examination
system. We consider to easier and cheaper way to achieve goals both of
security view and features view in OES. We have several points of interest
in designing a network for security, which are:
1. All access to the web and online examination server database is blocked,
except for access from registered proxy. It is hoped that this solution
can become one of the guarantees for high security in overcoming illegal
access from unauthorized users, as well as to prevent malpractice or
illegal use.
2. All outgoing accesses of the client, by which the examinee is taking the
examination, will be blocked except access to the online examination
server. By blocking all accesses to the outside from client, it is hoped
that cheating by looking for answers through the Internet or by using
Messenger applications can be overcome.
3. The operating system of the client uses Windows OS which will restrict
some actions during the examination, which are: prohibiting access to
Windows explorer, prohibiting access to external ports such as USB
port, CD/DVD drives, floppy drives, tape drives and others. This is
done because cheating in examination has frequently occurred through
obtaining answers from outside sources using drives on the client PC.
Figure 3.3 is a block diagram of the online examination system network
that we suggest. In this diagram, we assume that the data is transmitted
through the Internet using a secure system such as using https protocol or
other protocols that can hide data from eavesdroppers.
3.3.3 System Implementation
a.Web Application
For security on the website programming side, we provide initial au-
thentication facility which uses the user’s login and password. Moreover,
in the database, we hide several parts such as the password of each user
that is used for login using hash function SHA-3 which is taken from https:
//github.com/jedisct1/keccak-php, as well as all exam questions stored
in the database. We use mcrypt function of PHP with the most effective
encryption algorithm in [42].
We achieve cheating prevention with several features by making random
questions for each examinee algorithm, session system for one time login,
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Figure 3.3: Network design of Online Examination Systems
question bank, random seat order, randomizing exam schedule and time limit
algorithm for every question. This is based on a recommendation by [11].
We only will explain some new features which still not exist in the others
system.
Random Question algorithm
Randomization algorithms of exam questions that are widely used by on-
line examination systems today still use the shuﬄe function, which is owned
by the programming language, such as shuﬄe() or rand() in PHP and ran-
dom() in ASP. The weakness of this model is the randomness that is not
completely uniform so that in the case of this online exam, there are ques-
tions that occur very frequently and there are those that rarely occur. One
algorithm which is famous for its near-perfect uniform randomization is the
Fisher-Yates Algorithm [19].
The Fisher-Yates shuﬄe (named after Ronald Fisher and Frank Yates) or
also known as the Knuth shuﬄe (taken from the name of Donald Knuth), is
an algorithm to generate a random permutation of a finite set, in other words,
to shuﬄe that set. If implemented correctly, the results of this algorithm will
not be biased, so that every permutation is equally likely. The basic method
used to generate a random permutation of the numbers 1 through N is as
follows:
1. Write number 1 to N.
2. Choose a random K between 1 and N that has not yet been scratched
out.
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3. Scratch out the K, and write that number in another location.
4. Repeat steps 2 and 3 until all numbers have been scratched out.
5. The order of number written in step 3 is the random permutation from
the beginning numbers.
In the modern version currently used, the numbers chosen is not scratched,
but its position is exchanged with the last digit of the numbers that have not
been selected. Table 3.2 shows the flow of Fisher-Yates algorithm.
Table 3.2: Sample of Fisher-Yates algorithm Shuﬄe
RangeRoll Scratch Result
12345678
1-8 4 1238567 4
1-7 2 173856 4 2
1-6 5 17386 4 2 5
1-5 1 6738 4 2 5 1
1-4 3 678 4 2 5 1 3
1-3 8 67 4 2 5 1 8
1-2 6 7 4 2 5 1 8 7
Randomizing Result: 4 2 5 1 8 7 6
With a little modification from original Fisher-Yates algorithm, we con-
struct our random question algorithm. Figure 3.4 illustrates the steps of our
algorithms.
With this Fisher-Yates shuﬄe algorithm, we can assume that choosing the
set of questions for each examinee is done by uniform random distribution.
Let X = The number of questions in Bank question, Y = The numbers of
questions at exam and Z = Total of examinees who takes an exam in the
same place and time. Based on the permutation theory, we can compute
several things below:
1. We can compute how many possibilities different set of questions if we
choose Y questions from X total questions (X > Y ).
n = P (X, Y ) = X!
(X−Y )!
2. Then, we can compute how many probability of Z examinees for getting






Figure 3.4: Flowchart of Random Question Algorithm
As an example, If there are 150 questions in the Bank Question and we
will choose 100 questions for exam then we will have around 1 , 879x10 198
possibilities of set questions. If we choose one of them for 10 examinees
only, then they only have probability of getting same set question around
5 .3233x10−198 . It is very small probabilities, close to 0%.
Automatic scheduling and seating arrangement
In an automatic scheduling and seating arrangement system, we also use
the randomization method. The system with database of identities of exam
schedule and client PC selects an exam schedules, generates an exam both
at random and provide them to examinee during registration, by checking
whether the schedule and exam location have not been taken by examinees
who have registered previously.
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This process is performed by the system when examinee registered, along
with the generation of a user name and password that will be used by the
examinee to log in to OES. User name, password, exam schedules and exam’s
place are directly sent to the examinee’s email address by the system without
administrator intervention. In this case, an administrator is only in charge of
inputting the personal data of the examinees into system. This idea is based
on the suggestion from [20]. According to them, one of technique that can be
used to reduce cheating on exams is automated sitting positions. Figure 3.5
is an illustration of the registration process that will generate a user name,
password, automatic scheduling, and sitting position. If we assume that our
Figure 3.5: Flowchart of Registration Process
automatic scheduling and seating arrangement algorithm is uniform random
distribution, we can compute the probability of examinee who try to do
cheating by get a seat position side by side. Let X = Total examinees who
want to take an exam, Y = total available seats and Z = The numbers of
dishonest examinees.
Pr[R] = P ((X−Z),(Y−Z))
P (X,Y )
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As an example, If there are 100 examinees and 10 available seats in one
time exam. Then we can compute probability of 2 dishonest examinees will
get side by side seats as follow :






= 0.0001 = 0, 01%.
To generate random passwords, we create sets using scrambler function
which generates, for example, 8 digits derived from the numbers 0-9 and the
letters a - z. Figure 3.6 is a function of the scrambler password.
Question analyzing algorithm
Figure 3.6: Random Password Generating function
One advantage of our application compared to previous applications is a
feature to analyze the question which exists on the Bank Question. After the
exam is done, the examiner can see each question in the category of hard,
medium or easy. This analysis is based on a comparison of the number of
correct answers to the total numbers of answer which we call the difficulty





p = Difficulty Index
R = Number of correct answers to the exam and
T = Total numbers of the answer to the exam.
If the difficulty index is smaller than 0.2, then the question is considered
hard. If the difficulty index is in the range 0.2 to 0.9, then the question is
considered medium or moderate. While the difficulty index is bigger than
0.9, then the question is considered easy. The following figure 3.7 is our
questions analysis function.
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Figure 3.7: Question Analysis Function
b.Network Configuration
Several OES use Safe Exam Browser or Respondus Lockdown Browser at
the client side for security and cheating prevention. Creating special browser
using ActiveX [14] is another way, but both of them need high costs and
sometimes uncomfortable for all examinee. So, we remove these techniques
to make easier and cheaper. Our solution is using proxy and firewall system,
utilization of MMC (Microsoft Management console) and some additional
features for security goal.
Server Security
In the server, all data and application for online examination are stored.
We propose to use Linux server 14.04, using LAMP for web servers, using
MySQL for database server, using BIND9 for DNS system and Shorewall
[43] for Firewall system. The policy in Shorewall firewall server is to block
all incoming access, except accessing from listed proxy servers. We have to
set-up global rule to block all connection and a specified rule to accept access
from specified network at Shorewall firewall server. Besides, we also optimize
the configuration in iptables which is provided in the Linux kernel firewall
to set up and maintain tables of IP packet filter rules in the Linux kernel.
We have to set-up global and specified rule at Shorewall firewall server as
figure 3.8. However to ensure security on the server side, it is not enough
just with this configuration. Here, there are several addition features that
we have used for the server side:
1. We have installed the Intrusion Detection System (IDS) which serves
to check incoming and outgoing data packet activity in the network.
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Besides, it can identify suspicious pattern that possibly happen in the
network. We used ”snort” software as IDS because it is open source
GNU and it can also be modified as needed.
2. We have activated and configured the Malicious Code detector. Here,
we used ”tripwire” software which also open source and easy to config-
ure.
3. We do not allow the user to use remote programs such as telnet. All
remote programs are switched off after installation. To ensure security,
the administrative processing must be done with locally accessing.
4. We added ”Disallow: /administrator/” in robots.txt file or ”Disallow:
/[directory name]/”, where [directory name] is a directories which does
not want published in search engine. We need to protect these files as
good as possible because it is always used by a hacker to know our
website structure.
5. After completing development, we need to do restriction (chmod) for
all files and directories starting from the root of our website. all access
–rwx group should be disabled and accessing to ”other” user should
not be able to do ”write” process unless directories like cache which is
needed by the web server or directories where the file will be upload.
Figure 3.8: Global and Specified Rule of Firewall
Client Security
We adopt the squid proxy server because it has several advantages [44].
The policy in the proxy server is to block all http accesses, except access
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to the online examination web page. We have to set-up rule at proxy squid
server to block all http accesses, except the websites listed in the proxy list.
We can make a proxy list which can be accessed by client or examinee. We
have to set-up rule at proxy squid server too as show in figure 3.9.
Figure 3.9: Rule of proxy Squid Server
We assume that every client uses Windows operating system. In this
system, we want to make a policy that each examinee which uses this system
cannot access Windows explorer and external device port. Examine also can
not run several application softwares. Besides, we propose to use Microsoft
Management console (MMC) as a solution. It is a graphical user interface-
based component in Windows that accommodates administrative tools called
snap-ins [45].
As we have explained above, that we have prevented some cheating tech-
niques from configuring some of the ”group policy” on the client computer
to make a ”consoleonlineexam” using MMC. In addition, we also did some
security configuration in order to ensure some level of security on the client
side. In the ”consoleonlineexam”, we added the ”Security Template” and
”Security Configuration and Analysis” snap-in. This configurations aim to
limit the examinee user group permissions to access system file and registry,
so they cannot change the ”group policy” that has been set before. This
configuration also assumes that the administrator does not want the user
entered into the Power Users Group. The advantage of MMC is simpler for
an administrator with enough once to configure and can be applied to all
client computers in the network. Figure 3.10 is MMC configuration in the
”consoleonlineexam”. Besides, it can configure or analyze Windows oper-
ating system security. Its operation is based on the contents of a security
template that was created using the Security Templates snap-in.
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Figure 3.10: Microsoft Management Console Configuration
3.4 Security Considerations
As we have mentioned in section 3.1, the problems faced by the online ex-
amination system of several previous researches are security issues and the
problem of cheating. The following is an explanation of how to solve some
problems by the techniques offered in section 3.3.
3.4.1 Security and Reliability
a. Server Side
For security and reliability, we have taken the following features to our
server side system:
1. Database secrecy; We carried out encryption on important data stored
in the database. This is to prevent data theft when someone has suc-
cessfully accessed the database illegally. Password data is hidden by
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hash function SHA-3, and the examination questions are encrypted by
mcrypt function at PHP with algorithm XTEA.
2. Authority system; Systems authorize different authorities for each user,
and the users use the system within their own authorities. We try to
categorize our system into three groups; administrator, examinee and
examiner board. A session ID is embedded to each authorizing users
for preventing illegal access. The system can protect the questions and
test sheets in the database from deliberate steal or alteration. With
the perfect authentication and authorization, users are limited to au-
thorized functions, so that the security of data in the system can be
guaranteed.
3. Data access control; Firewall will control for accessing data to the
server. It blocks to access the web server from outside unless accessing
from the registered proxy. Firewall guarantees that server only can be
accessed by true examinees. Protection with ”Disallow: /administra-
tor/” command in the robots.txt file will hide our essential directories
from a search engine in order to hide from bad hackers. In addition,
restriction configuration ”chmod” for all files and directories after de-
velopment guarantees that no bodies can access, modify or delete it.
We perform a simulations attacks and testing aimed to determine the
ability of all parts of the system. Attacks simulation with an active firewall
(Shorewall) is shown in table 3.3. The result shows that the attacker cannot
know the number of open ports on the target (Online Exam server). It can be
concluded that Shorewall can hide the open port from viewed by computer
attacker. So the chances of attacks against the server online examination
beginning with port scanning can be overcome.
b. Client Side
In the client side, we have applied the client security control. Here, MMC
configuration can controls securities in the computer client. We configure to
restrict user for access system files or registry to modify or delete a group
policy which has been set by the administrator.
3.4.2 Cheating Prevention
a. Server side
We consider cheating prevention on the application program. The follow-
ing programs are used for the purpose.
1. Login system; This is the security standard for the online examination
system. To prevent exam page access by other examinees, or accessing
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Table 3.3: Scanning port simulation attack
Scanning port Active FirewallNot active Firewall








to the administrator page by unauthorized individuals, a login system
using username and password is required. It was hoped that the pass-
words are only known by authorized people and that it is periodically
changed. We develop every page by embedding a session ID which is
different for each examinee after they login to the system.
2. One time exam system; This algorithm only will limit the examinee to
be able to take the exam only once. If they have already completed the
examination, they will not be able to access exam question again. In
this way, the possibility of exam questions being leaked is minimized.
3. Fisher-Yates Random question; The purpose of randomizing questions
is to randomize the exam question so that each examinee’s examination
questions will have a different order. By the Fisher-Yates shuﬄe algo-
rithm, we can make a fully uniform random question system and we
give guarantee that all examinee will get question with different order.
There is no examinee will get same order questions. This will minimize
the cheating probability by exchanging answers.
4. Accessing period; Access to exam questions can only be done during a
certain period. Outside the time period, the examinee can no longer
access the questions.
5. Time limit; Each question will have a time limit to complete, so that
it becomes less possible to exchange answers or discuss between exam-
inees.
6. Bank Question; If the numbers of questions which is provided in the
database, much larger than the numbers of question which will be
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tested, then the opportunities for questions similarities between ex-
aminee and the others examinee will be smaller. So Bank Question is
one way to prevent the cheating between examinees.
7. Random exam scheduling and seating arrangement; In order to decrease
opportunities for test collusion between examinee, the system must be
designed to perform scrambling on exam seats and exam schedules.
Thus, examinees cannot determine when they will take an exam and
where they will sit in order to be close to friends. The study concerned
about cheating at Midlands State University (MSU) [20] suggests using
automated sitting positions. In their questionnaire responses, respon-
dents indicated that it can be used to reduce cheating. In general,
this feature aims at reducing the human work by arranging the exam
schedules and seats automatically, and to obtain an optimized seat-
ing arrangement where preventing two colluded students already have
agreed to sit next to each other.
b. Client side
There are several kinds of restriction in client side to prevent cheating.
In the proxy system, the examinee will be blocked to access another website
besides the online examination system website. Its purpose is to prevent
the examinee to find answers using the search engine or other facilities of
the Internet. In previous research, we have to use a specific browser like
Respondus Lockdown Browser or safe exam browser to prevent access to
another website.
Table 3.4 and table 3.5 show the results of simulation testing by accessing
various websites either using http, https or ftp, by writing the port number
used or without the port number. The result is that when a proxy server
is enabled then only the IP of the online examination system that can be
accessed while the DNS than that cannot be accessed. Conversely, if a proxy
server is made inactive, then all of the tested DNS addresses can be accessed
unless address of the online examination. It is concluded that the function
of the proxy server which is installed on the client can running well.
Besides that, we adopted to use Microsoft Windows operating system
for each client who wants to take an examination. The MicrosoftWindows
there is a facility which can help us to prevent the cheating by examinee.
We only need to set up and configure MMC.exe file to activate this function
and then we can prevent several common cheating technique like examinee
cannot access local and external storage using several drives like USB port,
CD/DVD drives, floppy drives.
The next experiment is testing the MMC settings to restrict access to re-
sources of examinees or computer client whether it is devices or application
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Table 3.4: Active proxy Server testing
URL or IP Address Result
http://133.28.214.58 (Online exam) Success
http://133.28.214.58:80 (Online exam) Success







Table 3.5: Not active proxy Server testing
URL or IP Address Result
http://133.28.214.58 (Online exam) Not Success
http://133.28.214.58:80 (Online exam) Not Success
https://133.28.214.58/ (Online exam) Not Success






programs, and the results are presented in table 3.6. It shows that we can
prohibit access to external devices by utilizing the functionality of Microsoft
Management console (MMC). MMC is already available on Microsoft Win-
dows which used by the client. Using some default application programs from
Microsoft Windows can be made disable like Windows Messenger, Windows
mail, Windows media player and so on.
3.4.3 Additional features
In order to make easier for participant, especially for administrator and ex-
aminer board, we provided several additional features:
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Table 3.6: MMC testing simulation
Access device or program Result
Accessing Windows Explorer Blocked
Using USB flashdisk drives Blocked
Using CD/DVD drives Blocked
Using Floppy drives Blocked
Using Windows+X hotkeys Blocked
Using Windows Messenger Blocked
Using Windows mail Blocked
Using Windows media player Blocked
1. Questions analyzing; Question analyzes feature can help administrator
or examiner board to analyze the result of the exam. From this, the
examiner will know where the difficult, moderate or easy question based
on test result. It can be a reference for make improvisation to teach or
make a question in the future.
2. Auto generated downloadable file system; Auto generated download-
able file feature will help administrator to make a report for examina-
tion result or question analysis result. It is very helpful to provide a
physical report which is sometimes needed for the formally report.
3. Bank Question file import system; This feature allows the administra-
tor to enter the question data into the database from files with *.xls
or *.xlxs extensions using a predetermined format without having to
input one by one. It is also very helpful for maintaining the secrecy of
questions from others person. With this feature, Administrator only
needs less time to transfer questions for the database.
Unfortunately, Website application and network design cannot meet some
security requirements because of malicious behaviors of bribed, corrupted or
unfair examiners, dishonest or untrusted exam authority and several inside
and outside attacks, and we construct a particular online examination pro-





Security protocol is one of the most important mechanisms in providing se-
curity of public networks because crucial information is hidden by this mech-
anism. In the design of security protocols, security issues and efficiency are
a major concern. Concerning the security issues, we should consider at least
the following 4 major security issues of networks, namely:
1. Confidentiality: Confidentiality ensures that the data or information
cannot be accessed by unauthorized users.
2. Integrity: Integrity ensures that the data or information cannot be
modified during delivery.
3. Authenticaton: Authentication has to guarantee both of the authen-
ticity of user and the authenticity of data. User authentication ensures
that the user who can access the system is a true user, while data
authentication ensures that the received data actually comes from the
true sender.
4. Non-repudiation: Non-repudiation ensures that user cannot deny the
data or information which she or he has sent.
Message encryption schemes and digital signature schemes are crypto-
graphic tools used for confidentiality, integrity, authentication and non re-
pudiation [4]. Confidentiality can be achieved by the encryption schemes.
Integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation can be achieved by the digital
signature schemes. In this chapter, we study a special type of cryptographic
protocol called certificateless signcryption scheme, which satisfies all of the
4 properties described above.
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4.1 Background
Public-key cryptosystems are one of cryptographic protocols widely used
nowadays. In the systems, each user chooses their own private key to cal-
culate its corresponding public key. In the use of the public key, one should
be able to know whose public key one is using. A certificate issued by a cer-
tification authority shows this connection between the public key and users
identity. Thus, the systems require Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) whose
bandwidth consumption and maintenance cost are usually high.
In order to reduce the burden caused by the PKI, Identity-Based Cryptog-
raphy (IBC) was invented. This concept was first discovered by Adi Shamir
[22] as well as Tatsuaki Okamoto [23] and its secure and efficient technique
was recently discovered by Boneh and Franklin in 2001 [24]. In the IBC, the
identity of a user such as name, ID number, email and telephone number
serves as the public key, and there is no longer any doubt about the authen-
ticity of the public key. Therefore, PKI can be eliminated. In addition, this
technique easily allows one to set the validity period of the keys without re-
quiring an additional key revocation mechanism. Despite these advantages,
the private key of the IBC is generated from users identity by the Private Key
Generator (PKG) and a key escrow problem inherently exists in the IBC.
Certificateless cryptosystem (CLC) [25] which is a variant of the IBC is
intended to prevent the key escrow problem. In the ordinary IBC, keys are
generated by key generation center (KGC) which is given a complete power
and is fully trusted. In contrast, the CLC considers a compromised KGC. To
prevent a complete breakdown of the system under the compromised KGC,
the key generation process is split between the KGC and each user. First, the
user generates a random value which is never revealed to anyone, including
the KGC, as in the public-key cryptosystem. Then the KGC generates a
private key based on the identity of the user, where the private key is now
a partial private key of the system and sent to the user. Afterwards, all
cryptographic operations by the user are performed by using a complete
private key which involves both the partial private key and the user’s random
secret value. Therefore, the best features of the IBC and the public-key
cryptosystem are combined.
On the other hand, there are several approaches such as signcryption and
Elliptic Curve Cryptography which focus more on the efficiency. Signcryption
introduced by Yuliang Zheng in 1997 [26] is a technique in which the func-
tions of digital signature and encryption are achieved in just one logical step.
It is effective in reducing computational cost and communication overhead
compared to the signature-then-encryption technique. So far, there have
been many studies on the signcryption. Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
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is based on the algebraic structure of elliptic curve over a finite field [27].
ECC has become a very important part in cryptography because of its high
performance by a shorter key with the same level of security as other public
key techniques. The Elliptic Curve-Discrete Logarithm Problem (EC-DLP)
and Elliptic Curve-Computational Diffie Hellman Problem (EC-CDHP) can
be defined in the ECC, and one can construct security protocols based on
these problems [28, 29].
The efficiency of the CLC can be improved by applying these approaches.
Actually, in 2008 Barbosa and Farshim [30] proposed a Certificateless Sign-
cryption (CLSC) scheme which combines the CLC and the signcryption
scheme. So far, several CLSC schemes have been proposed. However, most
of the schemes are based on bilinear pairings. The time needed for run-
ning bilinear pairings is about 10 times slower than that needed for running
the finite field exponentiation algorithm [31]. In order to overcome such an
efficiency problem, more efficient CLSCs based on the finite field exponen-
tiation have been offered by [31, 32] without using bilinear pairings. Even
so, the computation of finite field exponentiations as well as bilinear pairings
need large integer values for keeping the complexity of problems related to
them. Under limited resource environments such as low memory and power
consumption with constrained bandwidth, we need to find a more efficient
construction.
In this chapter, we further apply the ECC to the framework of the CLSC
and construct a more efficient CLSC. To this end, we do not modify ex-
isting CLSCs but construct a new certificateless signcryption scheme based
on elliptic curve cryptography from scratch. In the design of our construc-
tion, we pay attention to certificateles hybrid signcryption schemes [28, 29]
explained in the next section. The proposed scheme provides confidential-
ity, authentication, integrity, non-repudiation as well as unforgeability and
forward secrecy. Since it is one of CLSC schemes, it solves the certificate
management problem and the key escrow problem. By the evaluation of our
CLSC scheme via the implementation and other analysis, we shows that our
CLSC scheme has a better efficiency than existing schemes in terms of the
ciphertext size and the execution time of key generation, signcryption, and
unsigncryption phases.
4.2 Related Work
In 1997, Zheng [26] offered a primitive cryptographic technique that carries
out both digital signature and message encryption functions simultaneously
which he called signcryption. The cost of signcryption is much smaller than
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the signature-then-encryption model. There are several signcryption schemes
[33, 34, 35, 36] that have been proposed since 1997. One of them is a sign-
cryption scheme proposed by Zheng and Imai [36] that utilizes the hardness
of EC-DLP. They proved that this signcryption scheme has an efficiency of
approximately 58% of the computational cost and 40% of communication
cost the signature-then-encryption scheme based on an elliptic curve.
In the signcryption scheme, the user’s public key is a random element
of some group. Therefore, this scheme does not provide user authentication
itself because the random group element cannot define the identity of the
user. This problem can be solved by the use of certificates, where there is a
CA that provides a setting in which the public key is bound to the identity
of each user. This system is known as the PKI. However, PKI has difficulties
in the manufacture, storage, and distribution of its digital certificates.
To overcome these issues, Shamir [22] introduced the concept of Identity-
based cryptography. The main idea is that the identity information such as
name, e-mail, telephone number, or identity number of each user is used as
its public key and not derived from certificates issued by the CA. In Identity-
Based Cryptography, users can perform secure communications without the
need to distribute public key certificates, without the need to store a public
key directory and without the participation of online Public Key Generator
(PKG). In addition to that already offered by Chen and Malone-Lee in 2005
[34], there are already some identity-based signcryption schemes that have
been offered [34, 37, 38]. Unfortunately, their work still has the disadvantages
that key escrow problem such that PKG holding all secret keys of the system
has to be fully trusted.
Certificateless cryptography [25] is proposed to solve this key escrow prob-
lem. As a variant of Identity-Based Cryptography, certificateless cryptogra-
phy uses a users identity as a public key and the KGC generates a partial
private key of the user from th identity. Another private key is created by
the user. KGC is not fully trusted because it does not know the whole of
users private key.
The certificateless schemes that uses the elliptic curve approach has been
proposed in papers [28, 29]. These papers propose a certificateless hybrid
signcryption scheme, called CLSC-TKEM (CLSC-tag Key Encapsulation
Mechanism), to encapsulate keys that are shared by the sender and the recip-
ient. The concept is that the sender will create a session key using a random
value and the recipient’s public key. The sender then sends out a public value
that has a relation with the random value along with the digital signature to
the recipient. The receiver then calculates the session key by using the public
key along with the receivers private key. We adopt this concept with slight
modifications and also incorporate the concept of signcryption to consruct a
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Certificateless Signcryption protocol scheme based on Elliptic Curve.
4.3 Certificateless Signcryption
In this section, we offer the use of Certificateless Signcryption (CLSC) based
on elliptic curve cryptography without pairing function. A scheme based
on the concept of Barbosa-Farshim scheme [30] which can accept ID input
and message of any length as well as use a secure one-time symmetric key
encryption scheme and collision resistance hash function.
4.3.1 Formal Model CLSC
According Barbosa-Farshim scheme, certificateless signcryption is separated
to six-tuple of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms. Four of these al-
gorithms are corresponding to key management operations, while two al-
gorithms are identical to signcryption and unsigncryption algorithms. The
detail algoritms are the following steps:
1. Setup(1 κ). This is a global set-up algorithm, which takes as input the
security parameter 1 κ and returns the KGCs secret key msk and global
parameters pars including a master public key Ppub and descriptions of
message space M (pars), cipher text space C (pars) and randomness
space Ram(pars). This algorithm is executed by the KGC, which pub-
lishes pars .
2. Extract − PPK (ID ,msk , pars). An algorithm which takes as input
msk , pars and an identifier string ID ∈ {0 , 1}∗ representing a users
identity, and returns a partial private key d . This algorithm is run by
the KGC, after verifying the users identity.
3. Gen − SV (ID , pars) An algorithm which takes an identity and the pub-
lic parameters and outputs a secret value x and a public key P . This
algorithm is run by a user to obtain a public key and a secret value
which can be used to construct a full private key. The public key is
published without certification.
4. Set − SK (d , x , pars). A deterministic algorithm which takes as input
a partial secret key d and a secret value x and returns the full private
key SK . Again, this algorithm is run by a user to construct the full
private key.
The signcryption and Unsigncryption algorithms are as follows:
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5. SC (m, SKA, IDA,PKA, IDB ,PKB , pars , r). This is the signcryption al-
gorithm. On input of a message m ∈ M (pars), senders full private key
SKA, identity IDA and public key PKA, the receivers identity IDB and
public key PKB , the global parameters pars and possibly some random-
ness r ∈ Ram(pars), this algorithm outputs a ciphertext c ∈ C (pars)
or an error symbol ⊥.
6. USC (c, SKB , IDB ,PKB , IDA,PKA, pars). The deterministic unsigncryp-
tion algorithm. On input of a ciphertext c, receivers full private key
SKB , identity IDB and public key PKB , the senders identity IDA and
public key PKA and the global parameters pars , this algorithm outputs
a plaintext m or a failure symbol ⊥.
4.3.2 Proposed CLSC based on Elliptic Curve
This scheme modifies the Elliptic Curve Cryptography based Certificaless Hy-
brid Encapsulation Key scheme without Pairing [28] and the eCLSC-TKEM
[29] to obtain all the advantages of both techniques. The scheme consists
of three parts, namely Key Generator Center (KGC), Sender and Receiver.
KGCs function is to calculate the partial private key and public key pairs
for all users when they first join the system. This process is performed only
once at the beginning and can be done oﬄine. For the process, we divided
this scheme into seven phases, setup-parameter which is run by KGC, Set
Secret value which is run by each user, Partial private key extract which is
run by KGC, Set Private Key, Set Public Key which are run by each user,
Signcrypt which is run by sender and Unsigncrypt phase which is run by
receiver. In the initial phase, the system will select and publish all elliptic
curve security parameters for all users that exist in the system. Figure 4.1
shows our proposed protocol.
The following are details of the process of the system:
1. Set-Up Parameter: It is run by the KGC. KGC selects and publishes
system security parameters as follows:
• Fq = Finite field of large prime number q
• (a, b) = elliptic curve value < q , satisfy to 4a3 + 27b2 6= 0 and
q 6= 0
• E/Fq = elliptic curve over finite field, satisfy to q : y2 = x 3 + ax + b
mod q
• Gq = a generator of EC
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Figure 4.1: Certificateless Signcryption Protocol
• O = infinity point of EC, n is the order of F satisfy to n.G = O
• Hash function h0 = {0 , 1}∗ ×G2q → Z ∗q
• Hash function h1 = {0 , 1}∗2 ×G2q → Z ∗q
• Hash function h2 = G2q × {0 , 1}∗ ×G2q → Z ∗q
• After that, PKG chooses integer msk ∈ Z ∗q as the master secret
key and calculate Ppub = msk .Gq as master public key.
• PKG then publishes the public parameters (Fq ,E/Fq ,Gq , h0 , h1 , h2 ,Ppub)
but keeps secret the msk .
2. Set secret value: It is run by each user. User i with IDi performs the
following steps:
• Chooses randomly xi ∈ Z ∗q
• Computes public key Pi = xi .Gq
3. Partial private key extract: It is run by KGC. Here, KGC produce the
partial private key of every user based on their identity. The KGC
processes the user i with IDi in the following step:
• Chooses randomly ri ∈ Z ∗q and computes Ri = ri .Gq
• Computes public key di = ri + msk .h0 (IDi ,Ri ,Pi).mod q
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• Sends to user 〈Ri , di〉 in a secure channel
• User Validate di .Gq = Ri + h0 (IDi ,Ri ,Pi).Ppub
4. Set Private Key: It is run by each user. User i with identity IDi
performs to set a private key pair Ski = 〈di , xi〉
5. Set Public Key: It is run by each user. User i with identity IDi performs
to set a public key pair Pki = 〈Ri ,Pi〉
6. Signcryption Alice is the sender. She wants to send message m to Bob
as the receiver with identity IDB , and a pair public key (RB ,PB). Alice
chooses lA ∈ Z ∗q , then Alice computes :
• U = lA.Gq
• YB = RB + h0 (IDB ,RB ,PB).Ppub
• SK = h2 (lA.(YB + PB),U , IDB ,RB ,PB)
• C = ESK (m, IDA)
• s = (dA + lA.h1 (m, IDA) + xA.h1 (m, IDA)).mod q
• Alice sends to Bob chipertext = (C ,U , s)
7. Unsigncryption Bob is the receiver. He receives = (C ′,U ′, s ′) from
Alice. Bob computes:
• SK = h2 ((dB + xB).U ,U , IDB ,RB ,PB)
• (m, IDA) = DSK (C ′)
• YA = RA + h0 (IDA,RA,PA).Ppub
• Verify: Accept if s .P = YA + U .h1 (m, IDA) + PA.h1 (m, IDA) is
hold
4.4 Implementation in Javascript
In this section, we have implemented the simulation of our proposed scheme
using JavaScript to test its truth. All of the security parameters use large
numbers to protect the system from various types of attacks.
Here, we applied three types of elliptic curve function that are 512 bits
brainpoolP512t1, 512 bits brainpoolP512r1 and 256 bits brainpoolP256. This
value we are taken from
https://github.com/spruegel/Fast-ECDSA-in-JavaScript/blob/master/
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Table 4.1: Elliptic curve values of our implementation















































jsbn/sec_mod.js by spruegel. Table 4.1 shows the value of each type of el-
liptic curve function.
As for the operating point on its elliptic curve, we used a modification of
the ec.js file belonging to Tom Wu. To increase the speed, we replaced the
multiplication point simultaneously with faster-windowed method approach.
In addition, for the speed in the processing of the extract key generation in
this simulation, we made a key generation() function in the different js file.
This file stores the master secret key msk owned by KGC that must remain
confidential. The following figure is the functions that have been mentioned.
Figure 4.2: Key Generation function in javascript
For the one-way hash function, we have used SHA256 which takes the
input of any length and then generates a 256-bit output. The symmet-
ric encryption function used in the signcryption process is the AES algo-
rithm. We took both of these functions from cryptoJS, JavaScript imple-
mentations of standard and secure cryptographic algorithms from https:
//code.google.com/p/crypto-js/. Figure 4.3 and figure 4.4 show the
snapshot of our certificateless signcryption output.
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Figure 4.3: Snapshot of Key Generation Result
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Figure 4.4: Snapshot of Signcryption and Unsigncryption Result
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4.5 Analysis of the Proposed CLSC
In this section, we evaluate the correctness of proposed certificateless sign-
cryption scheme. Furthermore, we present a brief discussion about the se-
curity aspects of the proposed scheme. In addition, we offer the efficiency
analysis in computational cost and speed performance after implementation.
4.5.1 Formula Correctness
The equation SK = h2 (lA(YB + PB),U , IDB ,RB ,PB) in the Signcryption
side and SK = h2 ((dB + xB).U ,U , IDB ,RB ,PB) in the Unsigncryption side
should be same. So equation lA.(YB + PB) should be same with equation
(dB + xB).U .
While U = lA.P
dB = rB + msk .h0 (IDB ,RB ,PB)
YB = RB + h0 (IDB ,RB ,PB).Ppub
Then, (dB + xB).U = rB + msk .h0 (IDB ,RB ,PB) + xB).lA.P
= lA(rB .P + msk .h0 (IDB ,RB ,PB).P + xB .P)
= lA(RB + h0 (IDB ,RB ,PB).Ppub + PB)
= lA(YB + PB)
Then, for the formula s .P = YA + U .h1 (m, IDA) + PA.h1 (m, IDA) should
be hold. It is because,
While dA.P = (rA + msk .h0 (IDA,RA,PA)).P
= rA.P + h0 (IDA,RA,PA).msk .P
= RA + h0 (IDA,RA,PA).Ppub = YA
Then, s .P = (dA + lA.h1 (m, IDA) + xA.h1 (m.IDA)).P
= dA.P + lA.P .h1 (m, IDA) + xA.P .h1 (m.IDA)
= YA + U .h1 (m, IDA) + PA.h1 (m, IDA)
4.5.2 Security Analysis
A pair public and private key security rely on elliptic curve logarithm problem
(ECLP). Partial public key YA = RA + H (IDA,RA,PA).Ppub = dA.P , where
PA,RA,Ppub and P is a point on the elliptic curve over a finite field and dA
is a quite large integer value. If partial private key dA and P are given, it
will be easy to compute partial public key YA. However if the ones given are
partial public key YA and P , it will be hard to find partial private key dA.
On the same way for the other public key PA, it comes from a random secret
value xA(PA = xA.P). If secret value xA and P are given, it will be easy to
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compute public key PA. However if the ones given are public key PA and P ,
it will be hard to find secret value xA.
• Confidentiality.
If the attacker tries to obtain the original message from the ciphertext,
he has to know the keys SK. There are two ways to obtain the key by
the attacker:
SK = h2 (lA.(YB + PB),U , IDB ,RB ,PB).
If the attacker tries to derive the key SK from the above equation, he
has to find out the lA random value. In this case, it is infeasible to
solve the SK key value from the above equation because lA is obtained
randomly and only used once.
SK = h2 ((dB + xB).U ,U , IDB ,RB ,PB)
It is also possible to derive the key from the above equation. However,
the attacker has to obtain dB and xB because they are required to obtain
SK . It is nearly impossible to obtain the SK from this second equation
because dB and xB are the receivers private key which is known only
by the receiver. In addition, because of the hardness of ECDLP, it
is difficult to calculate xA and dA from the equation PA = xA.P and
YA = dA.P even if PA,YA and P are known.
• Authentication.
User authentication
The receiver uses the senders identity and public key (IDA,RA,PA)
and received digital signature (s) to verify sender authentication. The
sender signs in with their private key (dA, xA). So here, the receiver
can authenticate the identity of the sender.
Data authentication
The sender signs data m with her private key (dA, xA),
s = dA + lA.h1 (m, IDA) + xA.h1 (m, IDA).mod q and send it to receiver.
Then the receiver verifies the received data (m) using the received signa-
ture s . If s .P = YA + U .h1 (m, IDA) + PA.h1 (m, IDA) is hold, it means
that the data actually comes from the true sender.
• Integrity.
The receiver can verify whether the ciphertext was tampered or not at
the time of transmission using the following equation.
s .P = YA + U .h1 (m, IDA) + PA.h1 (m, IDA)
If the attacker changed the ciphertext c to c1 , then the received original
message should also change from m to m1 . As a result, during verifica-
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tion, the computed digital signature of m1 will not be the same as the
digital signature of m(s) sent by the sender to the receiver. Therefore,
this scheme provides integrity.
• Unforgeability.
Unforgeability ensures that the attacker cannot create a valid cipher-
text. Here, the attacker cannot create a valid C ,U , s) without the
private key of the sender. If an attacker forged a valid C ′,U ′, s ′ from
the previous C ,U , s), then C ′,U ′, s ′ has to satisfy the
SK = h2 (lA(YB + PB),U , IDB ,RB ,PB) equation
and s = (dA + lA.h1 (m, IDA) + xA.h1 (m, IDA)).mod q . It is impossible
to achieve without knowing lA, dA and xA.
• Non-repudiation.
In this scheme, the receiver knows from the
SK = h2 (lA(YB + PB),U , IDB ,RB ,PB) equation whether the original
message was sent by the sender or not. The receiver can verify because
the sender signs with his private key in the
s = (dA + lA.h1 (m, IDA) + xA.h1 (m, IDA)).mod q equation. Thus it
provides non-repudiation.
• Forward Secrecy.
This scheme ensures that even though the senders private key is ob-
tained. The attacker cannot recover original message m from the ci-
phertext C ,U , s). If the attacker tries to derive plaintext m, he must
decrypt its ciphertext using secret key SK using random value lA or
secret key of the receiver. Therefore, our scheme provides forward se-
crecy.
Table 4.2 gives a comparison of security attributes and features between
our proposed protocol scheme and others scheme.
4.5.3 Computational Cost Analysis
In this section, the time complexity of the proposed scheme is evaluated. Ta-
ble 4.3 gives a comparison between the computational costs of our proposed
scheme and those of the others schemes, in which the computational costs of
verification and symmetric encryption are neglected. We used some notation
to define a number of operation in that table which are given below.
• Exp = modular exponentiation operation
• Div = modular division operation
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Table 4.2: Comparison of security properties of certificateless signcryption
schemes and their variants
Schemes Conf.Auth. Int.UF.Non-Repud. Forwd.Secrecy
Zheng[26] Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
ZI[36] Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
WNPZ[32] Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
XX[31] Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SB[28] Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes unknown
WSB[29] Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes unknown
Ours Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes/No: Feature shown in the left column is/is not held.
unknown: It is unknown whether the security property shown in the top is
achieved.
Conf.:Confidentiality, Auth.:Authentication, UF.:Unforgeability, Non-
Repud.:Non-Repudiation, Forwd.Secrecy:Forward Secrecy.
• Mul = modular multiplication operation
• Add = modular addition operation
• ECMult = Elliptic Curve point multiplication operation
• ECAdd = Elliptic Curve point addition operation
• Hash = One way hash function
Besides the computational cost based on the mathematic operation, we
evaluate the performance of several processes of our certificateless signcryp-
tion scheme by implementation. We make comparison of our scheme with
only two existing CLSC schemes (SB[28] and WSB[29]) which are also based
on elliptic curve. We do not compare our scheme with the other existing
schemes because they use bilinear pairings or finite field exponentiation tech-
nique which have slower computation than elliptic curve computation. Fig-
ure 4.5 shows performances in execution time of each scheme in milisecond
while table 4.4 shows the comparison of the size of ciphertexts transmitted
from sender to receiver.
Based on the figure 4.5, we can see that our protocol performance is
faster than SB[28] scheme and almost same speed with WSB[29] scheme. In
table 4.4, we can see that our protocol has a shorter ciphertext size than
WSB[29] scheme and same with SB[28] scheme. It means that the perfor-
mance of our protocol is better than two other schemes.
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Table 4.3: Computational costs of different schemes
Schemes Type ParticipantExpDivMulAddECMultECAddHash
Zheng[26] SC Sender 1 1 - 1 - - 2
Receiver 2 - 2 - - - 2
ZI[36] SC Sender - 1 1 1 1 - 2
Receiver - - 2 - 2 1 2
Receiver - - - - 4 2 2
WNPZ[32] CLSC Sender 4 1 3 2 - - 4
Receiver 5 - 3 2 - - 4
XX[31] CLSC Sender 5 - 4 2 - - 3
Receiver 5 - 4 2 - - 3
SB[28] CLSC- Sender - - 3 2 4 1 4
TKEM Receiver - - - - 6 3 4
WSB[29] CLSC- Sender - - 2 2 4 2 4
TKEM Receiver - - - 1 6 3 4
Ours CLSC Sender - - 2 2 3 2 3
Receiver - - - 1 5 3 3
SC: Signcryption, CLSC: Certificateless Signcryption, CLSC-TKEM: Certificateless
Signcryption-Tag Key Encapsulation Mechanism.
We executed using windows 64-bit operating system, processor intel(R)
Core(TM) i7-3770 CPU @3.40 GHz and memory (RAM) 16.0 GB. From that
tables, we can see that bit length of the used elliptic curve influences of the
speed of the system because has relation to the mathematic operation. While
the Identity length does not effect to the speed. It is because one-way hash
function will execute in the same way from different input length to produce
same output length.
Table 4.4: Ciphertext size comparison
EC-CLSC Schemes Ciphertext Size
SB[28] nq + nG + nID + m
WSB[29] nq + 2nG + nID + m
Ours nq + nG + nID + m
nq : The number of bits required to represent an element of Fq
nG : The number of bits required to represent an element of point EC
nID : The number of bits required to represent an identity
m: The number of bits in the message being signcrypted.
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The security protocols of the Online Examination Systems (OES) has differ-
ences with the security protocols of other systems. If in the security protocol
of other systems we only need to consider a security issues, in the OES pro-
tocols we have to consider its own security issues and it also has to pay
attention to its cheating problems. Existing security protocols such as secure
http (https) cannot be used to solve all problems in the OES. Therefore, we
need a particular security protocol that is specifically for use in OES.
In this chapter, we offer a secure online examination protocol based on
certificateless signcryption scheme. We adopt a certificateless signcryption
protocol that we have designed in the previous chapter with a slight modi-
fication. In order to prove the security of our OES protocol, we model our
OES protocol using an applied pi-calculus and then prove its security by
formal analysis. We use ProVerif software for this purpose.
5.1 Background
Online Examination System (OES) has been developed as an alternative
method for test execution system. Although this system has not been able
to replace conventional test systems using paper, the system is expected to be
one of the alternative methods for test execution system. OES is supported
by the Question Bank information system that provides valid question data
with the multiple-choice format (objective) which has been stored in the
question bank database. Trials were conducted in special rooms such as
ICT centers or computer laboratories with a network system that is spread
throughout Indonesia or the entire campus.
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EOS was developed by taking advantage of internet technology for the
data communication process. Thus, a proper mechanism is required to safe-
guard the security of data on the OES, especially when there is commu-
nication involving Internet network where the data is prone to be stolen,
altered or destroyed. This mechanism is commonly known as the Protocol,
in which the protocol that is widely used nowadays for data security system
is a cryptographic protocol. The cryptographic protocol is a protocol that
uses a cryptographic system. People who participate in the cryptographic
protocol need it to share the secret component in calculating a value, gener-
ate a series of random numbers, authentication and so forth. Cryptographic
protocols are built by engaging multiple cryptographic algorithms which are
mostly designed to be used by groups consisting of two users, but some are
also designed to be worn by groups consisting of more than two users.
Best on our knowledge, there has not been researching that specifically
addresses the protocol used in OES. There are at least three papers that
have specifically discussed the OESs security protocol. The first paper is
from Castella et.,al. [12], in their paper, they attempt to obtain a secure e-
exam management system with some cryptographic primitive methods such
as encryption and digital signatures. The protocol is based on a trusted
third party (TTP), manager. Besides, this protocol system is protected using
conventional multiple security features such as firewalls, VPN, IDS, etc. The
system also uses Public Key infrastructure (PKI) for certificate management.
The second paper is from Huszty and Petho [39]. They design a security
protocol that is almost similar to the scheme by Castella et.al. It uses cryp-
tographic primitive models but tries to eliminate the trusted manager (TTP)
for the sake of anonymity property. The anonymity property is accomplished
by utilizing pseudonyms issued by timed-released service by some of servers.
But unfortunately, it has been found some security flaw in this scheme [40].
Rosario et.,al. [41] tried to construct Remark! in the third paper. In this
paper, they are written that Remark! achieves authentication, verifiability,
and conditional anonymity with minimal reliance on trusted parties. They
use Mix-net exponentiation method to obtain anonymity. As a result, this
protocol uses multiple server so that they have a problem of computational
cost and time overhead. In additional, It is same of two previous protocol
that uses PKI and it cause some problems in the certificate management such
as how to design certificates authority, how to handle revocation user and
how to manage a key.
In our scheme, we try to address the certificate problems which explained
in previous chapter, by adopting certificateless cryptography and then, in
order to increase the efficiency, signcryption could be an alternative solution
to replace the classical method signature-then-encryption.
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The objective of this chapter is to design a security protocol for OES
which is more efficient than currently existing protocols for specific OES
system with keeping its security.
5.2 OES Basic Assumptions and Network Ar-
chitecture
For the sake of our convenience in the design, some basic assumptions used
as an initial requirement for the exam, are as follows:
1. The examinee will use a smart card that stores the public key and
private key which are generated after the initial registration by filling
in the biographical data requested by the registrations server.
2. The smart card must also contain the identity and the examinees photo
as authentic proof which shows that the examinee who holds the smart
card is the actual owner.
3. The exam is only done at a certain time and location, according to a
schedule determined when performing the initial registration and has
been published earlier.
4. The PC that can be used during the exam is final and its position
cannot be exchanged, so that it will reduce the possibility of the ar-
rangement of the examinees seating position which may make cheating
possible.
5. The system is physically located in a secure place such as a computer
lab or ICT center and has already been set for OES.
6. There is control requirement such login system procedure to access
public board by examinees and examiners.
In general, the OES data communications system is a client-server rela-
tionship, because it involves the only computer on the side of the examinee
as the client and OES service and application provider computer as the com-
puter server. Client and server are connected by an Internet network. Each
communication process between the client and the server will involve impor-
tant data which needs to be safeguarded. Some of the data include:
1. Online Exam Setup Data. When performing the initial setup by send-
ing an examiners or examinee’s identity (user id) for example email or
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ID Number and his public value to the Key Generation Centre (KGC),
the KGC will then generate a partial public key and a partials private
key. Delivery of the private key from the KGC to the examiner or the
examinee must be secure. We use a smart card to store it and to be
given directly to the examinee.
2. Examination Data. Security of the exam questions data from its storage
aspect as well as from the delivery aspect is the next critical point in
our security protocol design. The questions data must be secured when
inputted by the Examiners, sent until it is stored in the database.
Similarly, during the examination process starting from the retrieval
from the database to the delivery process from the server to the client
is a critical point in the security protocol that must be considered
carefully, so that the data cannot be tampered with, altered, modified
or stolen.
3. Exam Answers Results Data. Answers produced by the examinee must
be sent back to the OES server for the assessment process. Delivery of
the exam answer results of the examinee/client to the server is another
critical point which may become a security flaw in the protocol that
requires attention.
4. Exam Marks. After the exam answers are checked and assessed, the
assessment results data need to be sent back from the examiner to the
examinee and also securely stored in the database. The safety of the
process of sending and storing marks data must also be ensured.
5.3 Threats and Security Properties
A threat is a potential force in a security system. In the context of the exam,
there are many threatening attacks. Therefore, the test system to be built
must be prepared to be able to protect systems from the threats that may
occur.
Threats that may occur in the conventional exams include question papers
received by the examinees are wrong, leaked questions paper or the use of
someone else’s identity to take the exam. Wrong and leaked question papers
may occur as a result of the process of preparing, printing and distributing
the question papers that require a long time. Such threats may occur due
to intrusion by unauthorized individuals or the modification of questions by
intruders. The threat of the use of another person’s identity occurs as a
result of poor identification process and surveillance.
61
Threatening attacks on conventional exams are different from the attacks
on the OES. Threats that occur on the OES may occur in the process of
exchanging information which is sent and received by the client and the
server. Data transmission security protocols on OES has the potential to
receive threats. An analysis of various threats that may emerge and attack
security protocol is highly required. In OES, there are some objects that
could potentially be targeted, among others: the session key, registration
data, exam question papers, exam answers and exam results. The threats
that are expected to emerge, among others are:
1. Spoofing that occurs during the process of communication between the
client and the server, such as when the client conducts registration,
login or activation for exams or also at the time of sending the exam
answers or results. Incognito also allows the repudiation of data sent by
a particular party. In this case, one party could deny sending the data
to other parties because the identity has been changed by the attacker.
This threat will be overcome by the authentication service.
2. Interception, in this case, what may occur is the intruder managed to
read the registration data, session key, and exam questions. This threat
can be overcome by privacy or confidentiality services.
3. Modification, in this case, the threat of modifications that may occur
in which the attacker changes the symmetric key or session key that is
used in the communication process between the client and the server.
This can cause the communication to be disrupted or even cannot be
done. Another possible threat is the attacker changes the questions or
exam answer results that were sent. This threat will be overcome with
integrity service.
A security protocol must meet the basic needs of security in accordance
with the required cryptographic aspects. Cryptographic aspects have become
an inevitable necessity in an electronic transaction like OES. Some of the
aspects that should become the security property of a security protocol of an
OES are as follows:
1. Confidentiality. All data related to the OES which includes exam
questions, answers to the exam as well as test results must be kept con-
fidential. Confidentiality service is done by applying a cryptographic






2. Authentication. In this case, the authentication requirements in OES
are entity authentication and data authentication. Entities authenti-
cation ensures that all examinee, managers, examiners entity are all
correct entities. While data authentication ensures that all data in the
OES process is the correct data coming from the corrects sender.
• Examiner Authentication
• Examinee Authentication.
3. Data integrity. All data contained in OES process must be guar-
anteed to be in an intact condition and unchanged. Data integrity is




4. Non-repudiation. Both client and server cannot deny that they had
sent the data. This requirement is guaranteed by using digital signa-




5.4 Our Proposed OES Protocol
5.4.1 Notation
In our scheme, we consider to three participants which are Examiner, Man-
ager, and Examinee. Besides we have a trusted center, KGC (Key Generation
Centre). A public board is used by Manager to publish the Exam question
forms, the Answer forms, and the Marks. It is also used by KGC to publish
public key of all participants, Examiners, Manager, and Examinees. In this
proposed protocol, we just explain a system by manually grading because a
system by automatic grading will simpler. The following notations are used
in order to describe our protocol.
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• KGC : Symbol of Key Generation Centre.
• A: Symbol of Examiner.
• M : Symbol of Manager.
• C : Symbol of Examinee.
• (ID[participant ]): Identity of the participant.
• (d[participant ], x[participant ]): a certificateless secret key pair of the partici-
pant which consist of a Partial private key and Secret Value.
• (r[participant ]): Random secret value of participant which is created by
KGC.
• (R[participant ],P[participant ]): a certificateless public key pair of the partic-
ipant which is constructed from random secret value r and secret value
x respectively.
• Y[participant ]: the Public key which is constructed from partial private
key d[participant ].
• P : Basepoint in the elliptic curve which is used in the protocol.
• lj ,Uj : Pair of random value and multiplication of random value to point
P respectively which are used to construct of certificateless signcryp-
tion. Subindex j identifies the number of the pair in this protocol.
• (Cj ,Uj , sj ): certificateless signcryption result. Subindex j identifies the
number of signcryption in this protocol.
• sj : certificateless signature result. Subindex j identifies the number of
signature in this protocol.
• SKj : A session key from the point of the elliptic curve. Subindex j
identifies the number of key in this protocol.
• C = E (m, SKj ): symmetric key encryption of message m, using key
SKj .
• m = D(C , SKj ): symmetric key decryption of C , using key SKj .
• h0 , h1 , h2 : Hash function.
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5.4.2 Set-Up of System
1. Setup Preparation, it is run by KGC :
Set-Up Parameter: Here, KGC will first generate and select several
security parameters to be used as a parameter when building a secure
communications protocol. The security parameters are same with se-
curities parameter in chapter 4. KGC publishes the public parameters
(q , a, b,E/Fq ,P , h0 , h1 , h2 ,Ppub) but keeps the msk secret.
2. Set secret value, it is run by each participant: User X with Identity
IDX
• Choose at random xX ∈ Z ∗q .
• Computes corresponding Public key PX = xX .P .
• User X then sends IDX and PX to KGC to get her partial private
key.
3. Partial private key extract, it is run by KGC : KGC receives IDX and
PX from user X and starts to run the following actions.
• Choose at random rX ∈ Z ∗q
• Compute RX = rX .P .
• After that, compute dX = rX + msk .h0 (IDX ,RX ,PX ).mod q .
• KGC then sends a partial private key dX to user X in a secure
channel and publishes RX ,PX which bounded to his identity IDX
in the public board.
4. Each user then sets their private key pair (dA, xA) for examiner, (dM , xM )
for manager and (dC , xC ) for examinee and sets their public key pair
(RA,PA) for examiner, (RM ,PM ) for manager and (RC ,PC ) for exam-
inee.
5.4.3 Set-Up of an Exam Question
1. Examiner IDA want to send an exam test form (idex , question) to Man-
ager IDM . Examiner performs the following actions:
• Chooses l1 ∈ Z ∗q , and compute U1 = l1 .P .
• Computes YM = RM + h0 (IDM ,RM ,PM ).Ppub .
• Computes a session key for encrypt between Examiner and Man-
ager, SK1 = h2 (l1 .(YM + PM ),U1 , IDM ,RM ,PM ).
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• Encrypts idex , question which is bounded to IDA,
C1 = E ((idex , question, IDA), SK1 ).
• Computes digital signature of idex , question and IDA:
s1 = dA + l1 .h1 (idex , question, IDA) + xA.h1 (idex , question, IDA).
• Sends (C1 ,U1 , s1 ) to the manager.
2. Manager (IDM ) receives (C1 ,U1 , s1 ) from Examiner (IDA). Manager
then performs the following actions:
• Computes a session key for encrypt between Examiner and Man-
ager, SK1 = h2 ((dM + xM ).U1 ,U1 , IDM ,RM ,PM ).
• Decrypt C1 using SK1 to obtain idex , question, IDA.
(idex , question, IDA) = D(C1 , SK1 ).
• Computes YA = RA + h0 (IDA,RA,PA).Ppub .
• Verifies the signcryption with computes: s1 .P = YA + h1 (idex ,
question, IDA).U1 + h1 (idex , question, IDA).PA.
If verification is true then the Manager stores an exam test form
(idex , question) which is bounded to the IDA in a secure way.
• After that, Manager executes several steps below: Chooses l2 ∈ Z ∗q ,
and compute: U2 = l2 .P . Computes signatures:
s2 = dM + l2 .h1 (idex , question, IDA) + xM .h1 (idex , question, IDA).
• Publishes (U2 , s2 , IDA) to public board as a receipt that he has
received her exam test form (idex , question).
3. Examiner (IDA) gets (U2 , s2 ) from public board and verifies signature
with computes:
s2 .P = YM + h1 (idex , question, IDA).U2 + h1 (idex , question, IDA).PM
5.4.4 Testing Process
1. Manager (IDM ) wants to distribute an exam test form (IDM )(idex,
question) which is bounded with IDA to Examinee (IDC ) to the pub-
lic board. We assume that each examinee has been authenticated by
Manager and only authenticated examinee can access the public board.
For each Examinee, the manager makes the following actions :
• Chooses l3 ∈ Z ∗q , and computes U3 = l3 .P .
• Computes YC = RC + h0 (IDC ,RC ,PC ).Ppub .
• Computes a session key for encryption key between Manager and
Examinee, SK2 = h2 (l3 .(YC + PC ),U3 , IDC ,RC ,PC ).
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• Encrypts idex , question, IDA and IDM ,
C2 = E ((idex , question, IDA, IDM ), SK2 ).
• Computes digital signature of idex , question, IDA and IDM ,
s3 = dM + l3 .h1 (idex , question, IDA, IDM ) + xM .h1 (idex , question,
IDA, IDM ).
• Sends (C2 ,U3 , s3 ) to the public board.
2. Examinee (IDC ) gets (C2 ,U3 , s3 ) from Manager (IDM ) in the public
board and performs the following actions:
• Computes SK2 = h2 ((dC + xC ).U3 ,U3 , IDC ,RC ,PC ).
• Decrypts C2 using SK2 to obtain idex , question, IDA, IDM .
(idex , question, IDA, IDM ) = D(C2 , SK2 ).
• Computes: YM = RM + h0 (IDM ,RM ,PM ).Ppub .
• Verifies the signcryption with computes: s3 .P = YM + h1 (idex ,
question, IDA, IDM ).U3 + h1 (idex , question, IDA, IDM ).PM . If ver-
ification is true then examinee answers the question to produce
answer form (answer) and then performs:
– Chooses l4 ∈ Z ∗q ,, and compute U4 = l4 .P .
– Computes YA = RA + h0 (IDA,RA,PA).Ppub .
– Computes a session key agreement between Examiner and
Examinee, SK3 = h2 (l4 .(YA + PA),U4 , IDA,RA,PA).
– Chooses l5 ∈ Z ∗q , and compute U5 = l5 .P .
– Computes signatures of answer form which is bounded with
idex, s4 = dC + l5 .h1 (idex , answer) + xC .h1 (idex , answer).
– Encrypts of idex , answer and its signature s4 using a session
key agreement SK3 , C3 = E ((idex , answer , s4 ), SK3 ).
– Chooses l6 ∈ Z ∗q , and compute U6 = l6 .P .
– Gets YM again.
– Computes a session key for encryption between Examinee and
Manager, SK4 = h2 (l6 .(YM + PM ),U6 , IDM ,RM ,PM ).
– Encrypts C3 ,U4 ,U5 , IDA and IDC :
C4 = E ((C3 ,U4 ,U5 , IDA, IDC ), SK4 ).
– Computes digital signature of C3 ,U4 ,U5 , IDA and (IDC ), s5 =
dC + l6 .h1 (C3 ,U4 ,U5 , IDA, IDC ) + xC .h1 (C3 ,U4 ,U5 , IDA, IDC ).
– Sends (C4 ,U6 , s5 ) to the manager.
3. Manager (IDM ) receives (C4 ,U6 , s5 ) from Examine (IDC ) and then
performs the following actions:
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• Computes SK4 = h2 ((dM + xM ).U6 ,U6 , IDM ,RM ,PM ).
• Decrypts (C4 ) using (SK4 ) to obtain C3 ,U4 ,U5 , IDA and (IDC ).
(C3 ,U4 ,U5 , IDA, IDC ) = D(C4 , SK4 ).
• Gets (YC ) from the session.
• Verifies the signcryption with computes: s5 .P = YC + h1 (C3 ,U4 ,
U5 , IDA, IDC ).U6 + h1 (C3 ,U4 ,U5 , IDA, IDC ).PM , if verification is
true then stores (C3 ,U4 ,U5 , IDA, IDC ) in a secure way and then:
– Chooses l7 ∈ Z ∗q , and compute U7 = l7 .P .
– Computes signatures of C3 which is bounded with (IDC ),
s6 = dM + l7 .h1 (C3 , IDC ) + xM .h1 (C3 , IDC ).
– Publishes U7 , s6 , corresponding with IDC to the public board
as a receipt for the examinee.
4. Examinee IDC gets (U7 , s6 ) from public board and verifies signature
and computes s6 .P = YM + h1 (C3 , IDC ).U2 + h1 (C3 , IDC ).PM
5.4.5 Marking Process
1. Manager (IDM ) needs to send ’answer form’ of the examinee (IDC ) to
related Examiner (IDA) for marking process. He performs the following
actions:
• Creates new random idX to bound ’answer’ which has a relation-
ship with Examinee (IDC ).
• Chooses l8 ∈ Z ∗q , and compute U8 = l8 .P .
• Computes signature of (C3 ,U4 ) which is bounded with idX ,
s7 = dM + l8 .h1 (C3 ,U4 , idX ) + xM .h1 (C3 ,U4 , idX ).
• Publishes signature C3 ,U4 , idX ,U8 , s7 , which is bounded to (IDA)
to the public board.
2. Examiner (IDA) gets C3 ,U4 , idX ,U8 , s7 from Manager (IDM ) in the
public board and starts to perform the following actions:
• Verifies signatures with computes:
s7 .P = YM + h1 (C3 ,U4 , idX ).U8 + h1 (C3 ,U4 , idX ).PM . If veri-
fication is true then:
– Computes SK3 = h2 ((dA + xA).U4 ,U4 , IDA,RA,PA).
– Gets (YA) again.
68
– Decrypts (C3 ) using (SK3 ) to obtain idex , answer and (s4 ).
(idex , answer , s4 ) = D(C3 , SK3 ).
– Examine start to evaluate the answer base on idex of the
question and gives him a marking ’Mark’.
– Then, chooses l9 ∈ Z ∗q , and compute (U9 = l9 .P .
– Computes signatures of (idex ,Mark) which is bounded with
idX , s8 = dA + l9 .h1 (idex ,Mark , idX ) + xA.h1 (idex ,Mark , idX ).
– Sends idex ,Mark , idX ,U9 , s8 to the Manager (IDM ).
3. Manager (IDM ) receives signatures (idex ,Mark , idX ,U9 , s8 ) and makes
the following steps:
• Verifies signatures with computes:
s8 .P = YA + h1 (idex ,Mark , idX ).U9 + h1 (idex ,Mark , idX ).PA. If
verification is true then Manager finds (IDC ) which has a relation-
ship with idX and stores (IDC , idex ,Mark ,U5 , idX ) and (IDA) in
a secure way.
• Then, chooses l10 ∈ Z ∗q , and compute U10 = l10 .P .
• Computes signatures of (Mark) which is bounded with (IDA),
s9 = dM + l9 .h1 (Mark , IDA) + xM .h1 (Mark , IDA).
• Publishes signatures U10 , s9 , IDA to the public board as a receipt
for the examiner.
4. Examiner (IDA) gets (U10 , s9 ) from public board and verifies signature
with computes s9 .P = YM + h1 (Mark , IDA).U10 + h1 (Mark , IDA).PM .
5.4.6 Notification Process
1. Manager (IDM ) starts to give notification of test result of Examinee
(IDC ). Before manager gives notification to the examinee, he needs to
confirm the original of ’answer’ to Examiner (IDA). Manager performs
the following actions:
• Chooses l11 ∈ Z ∗q , and computes U11 = l11 .P .
• Gets (YA) again.
• Computes a session key for encryption between Manager and Ex-
aminer, SK5 = h2 (l11 .(YA + PA),U11 , IDA,RA,PA).
• Encrypts IDC ,Mark ,U5 , idX and (IDM ),
C5 = E ((IDC ,Mark ,U5 , idX , IDM ), SK5 ).
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• Computes digital signature of IDC ,Mark ,U5 , idX and (IDM ),
s10 = dM + l11 .h1 (IDC ,Mark ,
U5 , idX , IDM ) + xM .h1 (IDC ,Mark ,U5 , idX , IDM ).
• Sends (C5 ,U11 , s10 ) which is bounded to (IDA) to the public
board.
2. Examiner (IDA) receives (C5 ,U11 , s10 ) from the manager (IDM ) on the
public board. He starts to check the origin of the ’answer’ which he
has marked in the previous session. Examiner performs the following
actions:
• Computes SK5 = h2 ((dA + xA).U11 ,U11 , IDA,RA,PA).
• Decrypts (C5 ) using (SK5 ) to obtain (IDC ,Mark ,U5 , idXandIDM ),
(IDC ,Mark ,U5 , idX , IDM ) = D(C5 , SK5 ).
• Gets (YM ) again.
• Verifies the signcryption with computes: s10 .P = YM + h1 (IDC ,
Mark ,U5 , idX , IDM ).U11 + h1 (IDC ,Mark ,U5 , idX , IDM ).PM , if ver-
ification is true then get (idex , answer , s4 ) from previous session
using the same idX .
• Verifies signatures with computes:
s4 .P = YC + h1 (idex , answer).U5 + h1 (idex , answer).PC . If ver-
ification is true then:
– Creates OK signal.
– Chooses l12 ∈ Z ∗q , and compute U12 = l12 .P .
– Computes signatures of (OK ) signal,
s11 = dA + l12 .h1 (OK ) + xA.h1 (OK )).
– Sends signatures U12 , s11 to the manager (IDM ).
3. Manager (IDM ) receives (U12 , s11 ) from Examiner (IDA) and verify
signatures with computes s11 .P = YA + h1 (OK ).U12 + h1 (OK ).PA. If
verification is true then:
• Chooses l13 ∈ Z ∗q , and compute (U13 = l13 .P).
• Gets (YC ) again.
• Computes a session key for encryption between Manager and Ex-
aminee, SK6 = h2 (l13 .(YC + PC ),U13 , IDC .RC ,PC ).
• Encrypts IDC , idex and Mark , C6 = E ((IDC , idex ,Mark , IDM ), SK6 ).
• Computes digital signature of IDC , idex and Mark , s12 = dM + l13 .
h1 (IDC , idex ,Mark , IDM ) + xM .h1 (IDC , idex ,Mark , IDM ).
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• Sends (C6 ,U13 , s12 ) which is bounded to (IDC ) to the public
board.
4. Examinee (IDC ) receives (C6 ,U13 , s12 ) from manager (IDM ) in the pub-
lic board and performs the following actions:
• Computes a session key SK6 = h2 ((dC + xC ).U13 ,U13 , IDC ,RC ,PC ).
• Decrypts C6 using (SK6 ) to obtain (IDC , idex ,Mark and IDM ),
(IDC , idex ,Mark , IDM ) = D(C6 , SK6 ).
• Gets (YM ) again.
• Verifies the signcryption with computes: s12 .P = YM + h1 (IDC , idex ,
Mark , IDM ).U6 + h1 (IDC , idex ,Mark , IDM ).PM . If verification is
true then Examinee (IDC ) get his result of the test.
5.5 Formal Analysis of Our Protocol
We can model the roles of online examination protocol as processes in the
applied phi-calculus. All of these process will communicate using public or
private channels, and can create a new random values, which can serve as a
key or nonce, such as. The process performs tests and cryptographic oper-
ations, which are functions on terms with respect to a theory of equational
describing some algebraic properties.
We analyze our protocol in ProVerif. We consider to privacy and authen-
tication properties formally specified in previous section. The property with
simple description are recalled below:
1. Privacy
• Question Confidentiality, which says that the questions are
not revealed until testing begins and by another persons.
• Answer Privacy, which says that no one can reveal the answers
of examinee besides the concerned examiner, include the manager.
• Mark Privacy, which says that no one learns the marks, besides
the examiner, the concerned examinee, and the manager (notifier).
• Mark Anonimity, which says that no one learns the association
between a mark and the corresponding candidate.
2. Authentication
• Examiner Authorisation, which says that only registered ex-
aminer can submit questions to the server.
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• Examinee Authorisation, which says that only registered ex-
aminee can take the exam.
• Question Authenticity, which says that the manager consider
only the question that the examiner actually submitted.
• Answer Authenticity, which says that the manager consider
only the answer that the examinee actual submitted.
• Test Origin Authentication, which say that the manager ac-
cept only answer that originate from registered examinee.
• Test Authenticity, which says that the examiner only marks the
tests intended for him.
• Mark Authenticity, which says that the examinee receives the
Mark assigned to her test by the examiner chosen by the manager.
In order to model privacy requirements as reachability properties, we just
check some terms which are needed to achieve by reachability-based secrecy
models, such as:
• query attacker(question); This query checks that attackers can reach
the term question or not.
• query attacker(answer); This query checks that attackers can reach
the term answer or not.
• query attacker(Mark); This query checks that attackers can reach
the term Mark or not.
Besides, we are necessary to define a number of relevant events in order
to model authentication requirements as correspondence properties. Events
normally need to agree with some arguments to capture authentication. Thus
we introduce the terms that serve as arguments in our events as follow.
• IDA refers to identity of Examiners.
• IDC refers to identity of Examinee.
• IDM refers to identity of Manager.
• question donates the questions of the exam.
• answer donates the answers of the exam.
• Mark donates the marks assigned to the exam.
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• dA, dC , dM refers to partial private key of Examiner, Examinee and
Manager respectively
• idex refers to identifier of the exam
Then, we define a list of ten events that allow to specify six fundamental
authentication requirements for exams. We stress that the list can be futher
extended to accommodate any additional requirements.
• event reg(IDX , dX ) means that the KGC considers the all participants
registered for the exam. The events is inserted into the process of KGC
at the location where the registration of participants concludes.
• event QuestionReceive(IDA, idex , question) means that the manager ac-
cepts the test idex , which originates from the Examiner IDA. The event
is inserted into the process of manager at the location where setup exam
question is considered as accepted.
• event AnswersReceive(IDC ,C 3 , IDA) means that the manager accepts
the encrypted answer C 3 , which originates from the examinee IDC ,
associated with the examiner IDA.The event is inserted into the process
of manager at the location where answer from examinee is considered
as accepted.
• event AnswerSubmit(IDC , idex , question, answer , IDA) means that the
Examinee IDC considers the test Cidex , which consist of question and
answer, submitted for the exam. The event is inserted into the process
of Examinee at the location where the test is sent to the manager.
• event AnswerDistributed(idx ,C 3 , IDA) means that the Manager con-
siders the encrypted answer C 3 , associated with exaimer IDA and
masked examinee idx for marking. The event is inserted into the pro-
cess of Manager at the location where the test is distributed to the
examiner.
• event GiveMark(idx , idex , answer ,Mark , IDA) means that the exam-
iner IDA considers the test idex , which consists of answer evaluated
with Mark . The event is inserted into the process of the process of
examiner at the location where test is marked.
• event NotificationResult(IDc,idex,Mark) means that the Examinee IDC
accept the mark Mark . This event is inserted into the process of ex-
aminee at the location where mark is considered as accepted.
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5.5.1 Model Choices
We model the public board as a public channel, and use the equational
theory showed in Table 5.1. The theories consists of the standard equations
for symmectric encryption, certificateless signcryption, digital signatures and
session key generator. A sessions key in the sender is computed based on the
a random value chosen by sender and public key of receiver, while session
key in the receivers is computed based on the random public value sent by
sender and his secret key correspondent to his previous public key. The
senders session key and the receivers sessions key should same according the
computational Diffie-Hellman’s property.
Table 5.1: Equational theory to model OES Protocol
Primitive Equation
Symmectric Key Encryption Dec(Enc(m, k), k) = m.
Certificateless Signatures −getMess(sign(h1 (m, id), l , ppk(r ,msk , h0 (id ,EC (r),EC (x))), x)) =
m.
−checksign(sign(h1 (m, id), l , ppk(r ,msk , h0 (id ,EC (r),EC (x))), x),
EC (l),EC (ppk(r ,msk ,
h0 (id ,EC (r),EC (x)))),EC (x)) = m.
Certificateless Signcryption −SK1 (l ,EC (ppk(r ,msk , h0 (id ,EC (r),EC (x)))),EC (x)) =
SK2 (EC (l), ppk(r ,msk , h0 (id ,EC (r),EC (x))), x).
−clDec(clEnc(m,SK ),SK ) = m.
−checkcls(cls(h1 (m, id), l , ppk(r ,msk , h0 (id ,EC (r),EC (x))), x),
EC (l),EC (ppk(r ,msk , h0 (id ,EC (r),EC (x)))),EC (x)) = m.
−valuser(ppk(r ,msk , h0 (id ,EC (r),EC (x))),EC (r), h0 (id ,EC (r),
EC (x))) = true.
The process of the examiner, the examinee, the KGC (Key Generation
Center), and the manager are shown in figure 5.1, figure 5.2, figure 5.3 and
figure 5.4. While the exam process is depicted in figure 5.5.
5.5.2 Results
We use a formal verification program ProVerif to show the correct execu-
tion of the protocol. Assuming an attacker in control of the network and
honest principals, ProVerif successfully proves all privacy and authentication
requirements. Table 5.2 reports the execution of ProVerif. Also assuming
corrupted principals, ProVerif proves the OES Protocol ensures all the re-
quirements. Table 5.2 also reports the honest roles that are required for each
requirement to hold. Note that we only model the processes needed to spec-
ify the requirement. For example, the specification of Anonymous Marking
requires two honest participants, they are examinee and manager, otherwise,
they could just reveal their test to the attacker, who would trivially violate
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the protocol. However, all other examinees can be corrupted and collude
with the attacker to violate the protocol.
Table 5.2: Summary of privacy and authentication analysis of OES Protocol
Requirements Result Honest Role
Question Confidentiality True Examiner, Manager
Answer Privacy True Examiner, Examinee
Mark Privacy True Examiner, Manager
Examiner authorization True Examiner, Manager, KGC
Examinee authorization True Examinee, Manager, KGC
Answer authenticity True Examinee, Manager
Test Origin authentication True Manager
Test authenticity True Examiner, Manager
Mark authenticity True Examiner, Examinee, Manager
Anonymous Marking True Examinee, Manager
75
Figure 5.1: The process of Examiner
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Figure 5.2: The process of Examinee
Figure 5.3: The process of KGC
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Figure 5.4: The process of Manager
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In this study of online examination system, we manage to overcome some
security issues of the system and some cheating issues from all parties by
establishing a basic framework. This framework combines the online exam-
ination web application, network system configuration, and communication
protocol as an integrated system.
In the context of web application, we combine several techniques for
cheating prevention like Fisher-Yates random question, time limit, automatic
scheduling, and seating arrangement.
In the context of network configuration, we use the combination of firewall
in the server, proxy and MMC in the client system as a security guarantee
for the online examination systems, both against cheating attempts by ex-
aminees and attacks by third party.The firewall in a server functions as a
blocker of access attempts to the web server from outside, except accessing
from the proxy that has been registered on that firewall and can function
as scanning port guard. Proxy server installed on the client functions to
block all access to the outside by examinees, except accessing to the online
examination server. MMC setting in the client functions well as a blocker
of examinee’s attempts to access external drives on the PC that they used
for the online examination, as well as to block the use of Windows applica-
tion programs that can be used by the examinee to cheat, such as Windows
messenger, Windows mail, and so on.
We have designed and implemented certificateless signcryption, CLSC,
based on the elliptic curve. Our scheme meets all of the basic security needs
such as message authentication, integrity, unforgeability, non-repudiation
and forward secrecy. This scheme is implemented using javascript and uti-
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lizes several existing libraries such as cryptoJS, sec mod.js from spruegel and
ec.js owned by Tom Wu. In the scalar multiplication operation with the point
on the elliptic curve, we have used the windowed method approach which is
faster than the double-and-add approach because it uses less point summa-
tion (which in practice is slower than doubling). Our scheme is more efficient
than the previous schemes because our CLSC based on elliptic curve which
is more efficient than bilinear pairings and finite field exponentiations used
in the previous CLSC schemes. Besides, our scheme offers shorter ciphertext
size than previous CLSC schemes.
At last, we have constructed an OES protocol scheme based on certifi-
cateless signcryption. We have shown how to model an OES protocol in
the applied phi calculus, and defined ten relevant security properties, four
privacy property and six authentication properties. We have analyzed the
security of our OES protocol scheme using ProVerif software. ProVerif shows
that our scheme is secure under the formal model analysis.
6.2 Future Work
As a future work, we plan to analyze our OES protocol under computational
model to ensure our security properties. We can use some software under
computational approach such as CyptoVerif which uses applied phi-calculus
to model their process.
81
Publications
1. Abdul Wahid, Yasushi Sengoku, Masahiro Mambo, ”Toward Construct-
ing a Secure Online Examination System”, Proceedings of the 9th Inter-
national Conference on Ubiquitous Information Management and Com-
munication, ACM IMCOM 2015, Article No. 95, January 2015. 8
pages.
2. Abdul Wahid and Masahiro Mambo,”Implementation of Certificateless
Signcryption Based on Elliptic Curve using Javascript” in IJCANDI




[1] M. Sarrayrih and M. Ilyas, ”Challenges of Online Exam , Performances
and problems for Online University Exam”, Int. J. Comput. Sci., vol.
10, no. 1, pp.439-443, 2013.
[2] P. Guo, H. F. Yu, and Q. Yao, ”The research and application of online
examination and monitoring system”, Proc. 2008 IEEE Int. Symp. IT
Med. Educ. ITME 2008, pp.497-502, 2008.
[3] O. T. Oluwatosin and D. D. Samson, ”Computer-Based Test : Security
and Result Integrity”, Int. J. Comput. Inf. Technol. (ISSN 2279 - 0764),
vol. 02, no. 02, pp.32-329, 2013.
[4] S. William, Cryptography and Network Security, vol. 139, no. 3. Boston,
USA.: Prentice Hall, 2011.
[5] V. S. Miller, ”Short Programs for functions on Curves”, Unpublished,
pp. 17, 1986.
[6] K. Aqeel, S. Kuldip, and S. Sandeep, ”Implementation of elliptic curve
digital signature algorithm”, Int. J. Comput. Appl., vol. 2, no. 2, pp.
2127, 2010.
[7] R.-J. Hwang, C.-H. Lai, and F.-F. Su, ”An efficient signcryption scheme
with forward secrecy based on elliptic curve”, Appl. Math. Comput.,
vol. 167, pp. 870881, 2005.
[8] D. Denning and G. Sacco, ”Timestamps in key distributed protocols”,
Commun. ACM, vol. 24, no. 8, pp. 533535, 1981.
[9] B. Blanchet, B. Smyth, and V. Cheval, ”ProVerif 1.88: Automatic Cryp-
tographic Protocol Verifier, User Manual and Tutorial”, 2013.
[10] B. Blanchet, ”CryptoVerif Computationally Sound , Automatic Cryp-
tographic Protocol Verifier User Manual”, pp. 141, 2011.
83
[11] G. R. Cluskey, C. R. Ehlen, and M. H. Raiborn, ”Thwarting online
exam cheating without proctor supervision”, J. Acad. Bus. Ethics, vol.
4, pp.1-8, 2011.
[12] J. Castella-Roca, J. Herrera-Joancomarti, and A. Dorca-Josa, ”A se-
cure e-exam management system”, First Int. Conf. Availability, Reliab.
Secur. ARES 2006, pp.864-871, 2006.
[13] B. P. U. Ivy, ”WebBased online Secured Exam”, Int. J. Eng. Res. Appl.,
vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 943944, 2012.
[14] S. Liu and Q. Gong, ”The research on anti-cheating strategy of on-
line examination system”, 2011 2nd Int. Conf. Artif. Intell. Manag. Sci.
Electron. Commer. AIMSEC 2011 - Proc., pp. 17381741, 2011.
[15] N. Chiranji, C. Depthi, and T. P. Shekhar, ”A Novel Approach to En-
hance Security for Online Exams”, Int. J. Comput. Sci. Technol., vol. 2,
no. 3, pp. 8489, 2011.
[16] B. Hang, ”The Design and Implementation of On-Line Examination
System”, 2011 Int. Symp. Comput. Sci. Soc., no. 1, pp. 227230, 2011.
[17] Z. Islam, M. Rahman, and K. Islam, ”Online examination system in
bangladesh context”, Sci. Environ. Technol. , vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 351359,
2013.
[18] A. Wahid, Y. Sengoku, and M. Mambo, ”Toward constructing a secure
online examination system”, in Proceedings of the 9th International
Conference on Ubiquitous Information Management and Communica-
tion - IMCOM 15, 2015, pp. 18.
[19] A. OluAde-Ibijola, ”A Simulated Enhancement of Fisher-Yates Algo-
rithm for Shuﬄing in Virtual Card Games using Domain-specific Data
Structures”, Int. J. Comput. Appl., vol. 54, no. 11, pp. 2428, 2012.
[20] E. Taderera, L. Nyikahadzoi, W. Matamande, and E. Mandimika, ”Ex-
ploring management strategies to reduce cheating in written examina-
tions: case study of Midlands State University”, J. Case Stud. Educ.,
vol. 5, pp. 113, 2014.
[21] S. Sabri, ”Item Analysis of Student Comprehensive Test for Research
in Teaching Beginner String Ensemble Using Model Based Teaching
Among Music Students in Public Universities”, Int. J. Educ. Res., vol.
1, no. 12, pp. 114, 2013.
84
[22] A. Shamir, ”Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes”, in
Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO84, 1984, pp. 4753.
[23] T. Okamoto, ”A Single Public-Key Authentication Scheme for Multiple
Users”, IEICE Trans., vol. J69-D, no. 10, pp. 14811489, 1986.
[24] D. Boneh and M. Franklin, ”Identity-Based Encryption from the Weil
Pairing”, SIAM J. Comput., vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 586615, 2003.
[25] S. Al-Riyami and K. Paterson, ”Certificateless public key cryptogra-
phy”, Adv. Cryptology-ASIACRYPT 2003, pp. 140, 2003.
[26] Y.Zheng, ”Digital signcryption or how to achieve cost (signature and
encryption) cost (signature)+cost (encryption)”, Adv. Cryptol. Crypto
’97,March, pp. 165179, 1997.
[27] D. Hankerson, A. J. Menezes, and S. Vanstone, Guide to Elliptic Curve
Cryptography. Springer-Verlag New York Inc, 2006.
[28] S. Seo and E. Bertino, ”Elliptic Curve Cryptography based Certificate-
less Hybrid Signcryption Scheme without Pairing”, CERIAS Tech Rep.
2013-10, 2013.
[29] J. Won, S.-H. Seo, and E. Bertino, ”A Secure Communication Protocol
for Drones and Smart Objects”, in ASIA CCS15, 2015, pp. 249260.
[30] M. Barbosa and P. Farshim, ”Certificateless Signcryption”, ACM Symp.
Information, Comput. Commun. Secur., pp. 369372, 2008.
[31] X. Zheng and X. Yang, ”Improvement of a Certificate less Signcryption
Scheme without pairing”, Int. J. Sci., vol. 2, no. 7, pp. 8187, 2015.
[32] S. Wenbo, K. Neeraj, G. Peng, and Z. Zezhong, ”Cryptanalysis and
improvement of a certificateless signcryption scheme without bilinear
pairing”, Front. Comput. Sci., vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 656666, 2014.
[33] J. Baek, R. Steinfeld, and Y. Zheng, ”Formal proofs for the security of
signcryption”, J. Cryptol., vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 203235, 2007.
[34] L. Chen and J. Malone-Lee, ”Improved Identity-Based Signcryption”,
Public Key Cryptogr. 2005, vol. 3386, pp. 362379, 2005.
[35] R. Steinfeld and Y. Zheng, ”A Signcryption Scheme Based on Integer
Factorization”, Inf. Secur. LNCS, vol. 1975, pp. 308322, 2000.
85
[36] Y. Zheng and H. Imai, ”How to construct efficient signcryption schemes
on elliptic curves”, Inf. Process. Lett., vol. 68, no. 5, pp. 227233, 1998.
[37] Z. Jin, Q. Wen, and H. Du, ”An improved semantically-secure identity-
based signcryption scheme in the standard model”, Comput. Electr.
Eng., vol. 36, no. 3, pp. 545552, 2010.
[38] Y. Yu, B. Yang, Y. Sun, and S. lin Zhu, ”Identity based signcryption
scheme without random oracles”, Comput. Stand. Interfaces, vol. 31,
no. 1, pp. 5662, 2009.
[39] A. Huszti and A. Petho, ”A secure electronic exam system”, Publ. Math.
Debrecen, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 209312, 2010.
[40] J. Dreier, R. Giustolisi, A. Kassem, P. Lafourcade, G. Lenzini, and P. Y.
A. Ryan, ”Formal Analysis of Electronic Exams”, Proc. 11th Int. Conf.
Secur. Cryptogr., 2014.
[41] R. Giustolisi, G. Lenzini, and P. Y. A. Ryan, ”Remark!: A Secure Pro-
tocol for Remote Exams”, Secur. Protoc. XXII, LNCS. Springer, pp.
3848, 2014.
[42] The PHP Group, ”Mcrypt Function, Manual book”, http://php.net/
manual/en/book.mcrypt.php, accessed Jan. 20. 2015.
[43] T.M. Eastep, ”Shorewall 4.4/4.5/4.6 Documentation, technical Docu-
mentation”, http://shorewall.net/Documentation_Index.html, ac-
cessed Dec. 12. 2014.
[44] F. Chemolli, ”Squid-cache Wiki, Online Manuals”, 2000. http://wiki.
squid-cache.org/ConfigExamples#Online_Manuals, accessed Oct.
10. 2014.
[45] Microsoft Developer, ”Step-by-step Guide to the Microsoft Manage-
ment Console, Technical Documentation”, http://msdn.microsoft.
com/en-us/library/bb742442.aspx, accessed Jan. 20. 2015.
86
